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ABSTRACT
The Nature of Intuition:
What Theories of Intuition Ought to Be
by
LAM Hung Nin
Master of Philosophy

Immediate striking feelings without any conscious inference are viewed as one
of the sources of truth by many philosophers. It is often claimed that there is a long
tradition in philosophy of viewing intuitive propositions as true without need for
further justification, since the intuitiveness, for traditional philosophy, suggests that
the proposition is self-evident. In philosophical discussions, it was extremely
common for philosophers to argue for the intuitiveness of their theories.
Contemporary philosophers have put increasing attention and effort into the study of
this methodology in philosophy. They explicitly use the term ‘intuition’ and
‘appealing to intuition’ to refer to such common practice in philosophy. Recently
there are numerous papers discussing the topic of intuition, its reliability, evidential
status, and what philosophy ought to be. These disputes have lasted for several
decades and it seems the disputes may even continue for several more decades.
Despite the excessive usage of the term ‘intuition’, there are still polarized
attitudes towards intuition: not only on the question of whether we should appeal to
intuition in doing philosophy, but also on what ‘intuition’ means. The latter problem,
the divergence of understanding on ‘intuition’, seems to be the main factor causing
endless disputes of this topic and it should be the problem primarily solved. There
are philosophers who notice the problem that there is no general agreement on the
accounts of intuition. However, surprisingly, most of them have not attempted to
solve the problem, but just simply give their own accounts of intuition, or claim that
it is improbable to have general agreement on the definition of ‘intuition’ instead.
In fact, it is possible to have a general acceptable theory of intuition. The main
aims of the thesis are to provide the method of seeking the good candidates for a
general acceptable theory of intuition and to use the method in seeking one of the
good theories. In order to achieve the goals, the thesis will (1) provide the ground for
the discussion, by specifying several features of intuition as the desiderata of a good
theory; and (2) examine several theories of intuition that have been offered in recent
literature as example. We will find that, unfortunately, among the theories selected
in philosophy, there still seems to be no satisfactory account of intuition.
Nevertheless, there seems a promising account of intuition offered in psychology.
The thesis will argue the psychological account is one of the good candidates of

general acceptable theory of intuition. If not, we at least have a method of seeking
the good theories of intuition.
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Part I
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 The Plan of the Thesis
Immediate striking feelings without any conscious inference are viewed as one
of the sources of truth by many philosophers. It is often claimed that there is a long
tradition in philosophy of viewing intuitive propositions as true without need for
further justification, since the intuitiveness, for traditional philosophy, suggests that
the proposition is self-evident. In philosophical discussions, it has been extremely
common for philosophers to argue for the intuitiveness of their theories.
Contemporary philosophers have put increasing attention and effort into the study
of this methodology in philosophy. They explicitly use the term ‘intuition’ and
‘appealing to intuition’ to refer to such common practice in philosophy. Recently
there are numerous papers discussing the topic of intuition, its reliability, evidential
status, and what philosophy ought to be. These disputes have lasted for several
decades and it seems the disputes may even continue for several more decades.
The excessive usage of the term ‘intuition’, which has occurred in the papers of
both advocates and opponents of this methodology for a long time, does not mean
there are many agreements reached in the discussion. There are polarized attitudes
towards intuition: not only on the question of whether we should appeal to
1

intuition or not in doing philosophy, but also on what ‘intuition’ means. The latter
problem, the divergence of understanding of ‘intuition’, I believe, is the main factor
causing endless disputes on this topic and it should be the problem primarily solved.
Some philosophers (Weinberg, 2007, p. 318; Williamson, 2004, p. 109; 2007, p. 215)
notice the problem that there is no general agreement on the accounts of intuition.
However, surprisingly, most of them1 have not attempted to solve the problem, but
just simply give their own accounts of intuition2, or claim that it is improbable to
have general agreement on the definition of ‘intuition’ instead. Philosophers seem
to ignore the fact that, even if they can successfully build up a positive account of
intuition, their theories are merely one of the competing accounts of intuition. They
still have the responsibility to show that their account of intuition has advantages
over other theories, before they can comfortably use their account of intuition in
the arguments.
The indifference towards the divergence of understanding on ‘intuition’ allows
philosophers to build up their own accounts for intuition. Different philosophers
have different understanding of the term ‘intuition’. For example, some view
intuition as: “a sui generis, irreducible, natural propositional attitude that occurs
1

Bealer (1992; 1998; 1999) has a part trying to do this job in his papers. It is not, however, a
sufficient and systematic probe into the contemporary theories of intuition. More importantly, he
seems not to have the same target with the thesis and thus could not give us a satisfactory account
of intuition in our sense, which will be discussed in part II.
2
Recently Cappelen (2012) argues that philosophers do not use intuition as methodology in doing
philosophy, but his argument also built on his own conception of intuition.
2

episodically” (Bealer, 1998, p. 213) which mainly concerns modal propositions;
inclination to believe a proposition by merely understanding it (Sosa); immediate
feelings on classification or application of the concepts or natural kinds (Goldman;
Kornblith; Devitt); merely (quick) judgments generated by our ordinary mechanisms
(Williamson); merely retrieval of past opinions or beliefs (Lewis; Van Inwagen) et
cetera. Most of the philosophers seem to be not interested in seeking a generally
accepted theory of intuition. They are mainly interested in arguing for the reliability
and the evidential status of intuition, and only a few of them attempt to directly
argue against other accounts of intuition. Ironically, their discussion will probably
not come to a conclusion, unless there is a generally accepted theory of intuition.
One of the reasons that philosophers avoid seeking a generally accepted
theory of intuition probably is they think that it is not possible to find one. However,
general agreement on the theory of intuition, I believe, is not impossible to seek,
and it is worth seeking, since the generally accepted theory of intuition can
probably lead to progress in resolving other disputes of intuition (if not directly give
us the answer).
The thesis attempts to show how it is possible to have a generally accepted
theory of intuition. The main aims of this thesis are to provide the method of
seeking a generally acceptable theory of intuition and to use the method in seeking
3

one of the good theories. In order to achieve the goals, the thesis will (1) first
provide the ground for the discussion by specifying several features of intuition as
the desiderata of a good theory. The theories of intuition have the responsibility to
give satisfactory explanations of these features. If the theory cannot give a
reasonable explanation for most of the features, it fails to be a good candidate of
the accounts of intuition. After forming the ground of selecting theories, we can
easily (2) examine several theories of intuition that have been offered in recent
literature and we are more likely to find a generally acceptable, good theory of
intuition.
Here is the plan: this thesis will be divided into two parts. In the first part, the
thesis will specify several features of intuition, directly or indirectly supported by
psychological research if they are not generally accepted.3 Good explanations for
these features of intuition would be the desiderata for a good theory of intuition.
Thus the features are the criteria for us in selecting good candidates of theories of
intuition.
In the second part, the thesis will introduce several substantial theories of
intuition offered in recent literature, and evaluate these theories by whether they

3

I choose to believe that psychological research can reflect what our intuition is, although some
philosophers (e.g. Bealer; Ludwig) do not believe. Their arguments against psychological research
(third-person approach) on intuition and the reasons that I still believe in psychological research will
be discussed in later section and in part II.
4

can offer good explanations for the features of intuition listed in part I. We will find
that, unfortunately, there still seems to be no satisfactory account of intuition
among the theories selected in philosophy, but there seems to be a good theory of
intuition in psychology. Even if this conclusion is controversial, the thesis at least
provides the ground of selecting good theories of intuition, with the help from
psychological research.
It is the time for us to progress to the next section. But before we follow the
plan to discuss the features of intuition, there are some related issues that have to
be discussed in advance.

1.2 Background Questions
To avoid ambiguity and misunderstanding, the thesis plans to use some space
to discuss three problems of intuition first, namely: (1) what intuition is; (2) what
kinds of theories we are seeking; (3) the disunity of intuition; and (4) the argument
of irrelevance. It is important to clarify the terms that will be used in this paper and
to have some consensus on what sorts of evidence we can use in studying intuition,
since it is difficult to continue our discussion unless we can have some agreements
on these three problems. They will be discussed in the following in turn.

5

1.2.1. What is intuition: The target of this paper
When a professor tries to explain what methodology philosophy uses in the
classroom, he/she usually gives the students a thought experiment to consider. The
professor gives, for example, the case of the inhospitable hospital to the students: a
case asking whether a doctor should cut up a healthy person and give the vital
organs to five patients in order to save their life. Normally this thought experiment
can elicit the intuitive feelings of students that ‘the doctor should not cut up the
healthy person’. When most of the students reply that they have a kind of
immediate striking feeling for this case, the professor will ask them to refer this kind
of experience as intellectual seeming or intuition.
This kind of experience is believed to be commonly shared by many people.
Using this kind of experience in justification is argued as the traditional
characteristic methodology of philosophy. The uses of this kind of experience in
arguments generally appear in the history of philosophy, starting from the time of
Plato. For example in the Theaetetus, Socrates argues against the claim that
‘knowledge is merely true judgment’ by using the analogy with the jury, eliciting
Theaetetus and the readers’ striking feelings in supporting his claim. In the
Meditations, Descartes argues that the existence of God is justified by the ‘light of
nature’, which is similar to the striking feelings mentioned.
6

The aims of this thesis are to provide the method of seeking a generally
acceptable theory of intuition and to seek one of the good theories. The targeted
‘intuition’ here is the intuition in philosophical sense, which appeared in the
philosophical discussions mentioned above. The paper is willing to give a clear
definition for this kind of striking experience if it can. However, even though the
term ‘intuition’ is excessively used in contemporary philosophical discussion, it still
seems exceedingly difficult to give a satisfactory generally accepted definition for
this kind of feeling.
This kind of experience is clearly different from ‘intuition’ in the ordinary sense.
As Sosa points out, in the ordinary context, it is acceptable to define ‘intuition’ as
‘apprehensions without reasoning’, but this definition would include perceptual
and introspective apprehensions also, which are clearly not the targets in our
philosophical discussions. Even if we change the definition to “non-inferential belief
due neither to perception nor to introspection” (Sosa, 1998, pp. 257-258), the
definition is too broad since it still includes beliefs unrelated to our discussion such
as hunches and guesses. The ‘intuition’ we are interested in is different from the
ordinary and broad sense in daily conversation. To discuss ‘intuition’ in
philosophical sense, we probably need a more detailed description or a new
definition for ‘intuition’.
7

Therefore, it is natural for philosophers to specify the targets of their studies in
intuition, to restrict the use of term ‘intuition’ to the use which philosophers care
about. For example, Alvin Goldman and Frank Jackson specify that their interested
target is classification or application intuitions, distinguished from what Goldman
calls ‘garden-variety intuitions’, which include “premonitions about future events,
intuitions about a person’s character (based on his appearance, or a brief snatch of
conversation), and intuitions about probabilistic relationships.” (Goldman, 2007, p.
3) George Bealer (1998) distinguishes rational intuition from physical intuition, and
claims that rational intuition is the target of philosophical discussion.
These are the attempts of philosophers trying to distinguish the notion of
‘intuition’ between the use in the daily conversation and the use in the
philosophical sense, and it seems that we have to restrict the use of the term to the
philosophical sense. However, we might worry that the philosophers restrict the
use of the term to a controversial sense or to a too narrow sense. The specification
of the term may also not be sufficiently clear. For instance, ‘2+2=4’ is one of the
examples of intuition for Sosa (1998) and it seems not to be a kind of classification
or application intuition for Goldman, but it is believed that most of us would count
it as one of the targets we would like to be discussed. Bealer (1998) also restricts
his account of intuition to the immediate feelings elicited in the reliably good
8

cognitive conditions. Bealer says: “[s]uch conditions might be beyond what
individual human beings can achieve in isolation” (1998, p. 202), which is so far-out
that would exclude most of philosophical practice. But the experience we are
interested in seem should be commonly and easily found in philosophy. It seems
that these philosophers have to relax restrictions for the uses of the term, by
clarifying what they mean by the classification intuition or rational intuition, in
order to include the experience we are interested in, but a more direct approach
would be to have a new specification on the target of discussion, to include most of
the intuitions we are interested in, in an easier way.
The paper will use the term ‘intuition’ in the broader sense than those
philosophers specified, to include some of the mathematical or probabilistic
intuitions. On the other hand, the term will be used in a narrower sense than the
use in the daily conversation, excluding hunches and guesses. It seems to be
generally accepted that intuition is some robust, striking, rapid feelings generated
by apprehending propositions or thought experiments, without any conscious
inference processes. Although the description given may have flaws, the targets are
familiar enough to form a basis for the current discussion, thus this description for
the target seems to be sufficient for current purposes. Note that in the following,
the thesis will also use the term ‘intuitive feelings’ to mean the feelings described
9

above.

1.2.2. What kinds of theories we are seeking?
The thesis describes intuition as robust, striking, rapid feelings generated by
apprehending propositions or thought experiments, without any conscious
inference process. Someone may then ask, “Why isn’t this the theory of intuition
we are seeking?” If we think it is uncontroversial that intuition is immediate striking
feelings, then it could be viewed as a generally accepted theory for intuition. Why
does the thesis not consider this as one of good theories of intuition?
The thesis has to emphasize that the theories we are really interested in are
not merely true, but also complete and valuable. By complete and valuable, the
thesis means the theories of intuition have to be able to explain how our intuition
operates, to explain why we have the intuitions we do on particular cases and to
accurately predict what intuitions we will have when encountering a certain
thought experiment. This can help us in giving us more insight into intuition, for
example its reliability and its evidential status. A good theory of intuition may even
help us to answer whether philosophers ought to use intuition as methodology in
studying philosophy.
Complete and valuable theories are expected to have explanatory and
10

predictive power, which can help us to answer further questions about intuition.
Therefore the theories we are seeking are not merely analyses of the notion of
intuition, but also theories that are capable of explaining and predicting what
intuition we will have. What is added to our knowledge of intuition if we take
‘immediate striking feelings’ as theory of intuition? ‘Immediate striking feelings’
itself as theory of intuition could not clearly and directly give us information on how
our intuition operates and what intuition we will have, and could not suggest us an
answer to the further questions about intuition. Compare this with a theory of
water; imagine we are told that the definition of water is ‘H2O’, but not anything
else about chemistry. It may be a perfect definition of water. However, could we
thus claim that this definition itself is a complete and valuable theory for water?
Saying that water is H2O by itself, without accompanying chemical theory, could not
give us explanation of some important features of water, like the reason why water
is in the form of liquid at room temperature. Could the theory by itself predict what
will happen if we boil water? To view the theory in this aspect, it seems we could
not say ‘water is H2O’ is a complete and valuable theory of water.
In a similar vein, ‘immediate striking feelings’ may be a true definition of
intuition, but it is not a full and successful theory. To be a full and successful theory,
there are many details that have to be filled in. There are many suggestions on how
11

to fill in the details for this simple theory; we will examine some of them in chapter
3 and 4. Therefore, rather than attempting to modify this simple theory by
ourselves, it may be quicker and better to seek a good theory of intuition among
the theories selected in chapter 3 and 4.
The main point the thesis emphasized in this section is that the theories we
are really interested in are the theories that have explanatory and predictive power
on intuition. These kinds of theories are expected to be able to lead us to solve
some further problems on intuition, on its reliability, its evidential status and
whether philosophy ought to use it as methodology.

1.2.3. The disunity of intuition
We know that there are different kinds of intuition: epistemic intuition,
mathematical intuition, moral intuition and the like. To have a theory of intuition
seems to imply that we view these different kinds of ‘intuition’ as unified in a
relevant way. Some philosophers argue that such unification should not merely be
done by its verbal label ‘intuition’, but have to be unified in a relevant sense:
contents, phenomenology, origins, et cetera.
One of the features of intuition in a later chapter (2.6 Heterogeneity) suggests
that different kinds of intuition are not common in their contents, brain
12

mechanisms and so on. Someone thus questions whether it is possible to have a
theory of intuition in general. Using an example from Sinnott-Armstrong and
Wheatley (2012, p. 1), “Consider mineralogy. … [J]ade is not a unified mineral. Jade
consists of two subtypes – jadeite and nephrite – with different chemical
compositions: Jadeite is a type of pyroxene, and nephrite is a type of tremolite.
Because of these chemical differences, it would be silly for a mineralogist to try to
formulate a precise theory of jade in general.” Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley
take this example as an analogy to moral judgments and claim that moral
judgments are not unified in content, phenomenology, force, form, function, or
brain mechanism; thus it is hard and not worth having a single theory for moral
judgments. The example can also be taken as an analogy to intuition. There are in
fact different kinds of intuition and they are not unified by the content, function,
and brain mechanism either. Would it also be silly to have a general theory of
intuition? It will undermine the thesis if it is not possible and not worthwhile to
seek a general theory of intuition.
Though intuition is not unified in contents and brain mechanisms, it does not
follow that it is impossible or not worthwhile to seek a general theory of intuition.
The general theory is possibly valuable even if the targets of the theory are not
genuinely unified. Taking perception as an example, there are theories for various
13

different types of perception, and scientific research on the structures and
mechanisms of different senses: vision, hearing, olfaction, gustation, cutaneous
senses and so on. We have a theory for any particular sense and these different
senses obviously are not unified by their contents, phenomenology or brain
mechanisms. Does it follow that it is silly to study perception as a unified topic or to
seek a general theory of perception? Clearly it is not the case. The general theory of
perception is needed to study the processes of perception: sensation, perceptual
organization and identification of objects. We need the general theory to get the
principles of perceptual grouping: How do we analyze and group sensory data?
How different senses interact each other and identify objects? (Gerrig & Zimbardo,
2010) It is clearly insufficient for particular theories of perception to work
independently and any particular theory of perception cannot give us what the
general theory of perception can tell us.
In the general theory of perception, psychologists maintain that, for example,
there are processes determining us to put attention to a particular object or event.
One of these attentional processes is stimulus-driven capture. Stimulus-driven
capture refers to the phenomenon where our focus is automatically captured by a
particular object in the environment even when we are not attending to it. The
phenomenon occurs in vision (e.g. the colour of a traffic light changes from red to
14

green) and also in hearing (e.g. you can clearly hear someone said your name even
in a noisy environment). (Gerrig & Zimbardo, 2010) The best that a theory of any
particular sense can do is only to generate the process of attention in particular
senses, but the phenomenon seems not to be and should not be viewed as a
separate organizational process for any particular sense. Only the general theory of
perception can organize the phenomena to be a general process of attention.
In studying perceptual grouping, a
group of psychologists argue that we

use a series of principles in grouping

Figure 1 The law of proximity: humans tend to group
the closest perceptual elements

the sensory data. These principles,
known as the Gestalt principles, mainly apply in visual experience, but some of the
principles can also apply to other types of perception like hearing. In vision, it is
observed that humans use the law of proximity in grouping perceptual elements:
humans tend to group the closest perceptual elements as a unit. For example, we
tend to group the right-handed sided figure of Figure 1 as a three-column figure,
while viewing the left-handed sided figure as a whole. (Gerrig & Zimbardo, 2010)
On the other hand, humans also organize and group our perceptual elements in the
realm of hearing. (Bregman, 1990) The Gestalt principles can also explain the
grouping behavior of hearing. Using the law of proximity as an example again, when
15

we hear six clicks sound with regular temporal interval, we tend to organize them as
six separated sounds. However, when we hear the sound with short temporal
interval and long temporal interval appear alternately, we tend to group the
perceptual elements as three double-click sounds rather than six separated sounds.
It suggests that we are using the similar principle of grouping in hearing to vision
and it is expected the principles may somehow apply to other types of perception
also. Without the general theory of perception to view perception as a whole, it is
unclear how we can generalize the Gestalt principles in vision to other types of
perception.
Therefore, though the different types of perception are not unified, it is still
possible, reasonable and valuable to study perception as a unified topic and have a
general theory of perception.
There are various types of intuition which cannot be unified easily. There are
also various researches (2.6) find that different types of intuition are actually
generated by different brain mechanisms. The disunity of intuition, however, does
not entail that we cannot study intuition as a unified topic and seek good
candidates for the general theory of intuition, similar to perception. Though we
cannot ensure that the general theory of intuition is as valuable as the general
theory of perception, it does not prevent us from studying intuition as a unified
16

topic and it seems worth attempting to find the general theory of intuition at the
starting stage. We can probably gain a better understanding on what intuition is.

1.2.4. The argument of irrelevance (IA)
Recently it is common for psychology and experimental philosophy to conduct
surveys on the folk (i.e. non-academics). There are numerous researches conducted
by asking the folk’s responses to the philosophical thought experiments. The
experimenters relate the data from the studies to the study of intuition, and
interpret the general responses of the folk as the general intuitions of humans. For
convenience, in the following the paper will call this experimenters-subjects
method of studying intuition, following Ludwig (2007), the third-person approach.
This contrasts with the first-person approach, where the method of experimenters
are subjects (i.e. self-contemplation), in which the philosophers who are interested
in intuition on any questions will sit in a comfortable armchair and ask
himself/herself about what he/she thinks, instead of asking the opinions of the
folks on the street.
In the study of intuition, some advocates of intuition (e.g. (Bealer; Ludwig))
impugn the third-person approach. The advocates emphasize that there is a gap
between intuitive feelings and responses. The studies from psychology and
17

experimental philosophy can only collect the responses from the subjects, and the
studies may not reflect the intuitive feelings the subjects have since the limitations
of third-person approach which cannot be rectified enlarge the gap between the
feelings and the responses. The argument that the psychological and experimental
philosophical researches are irrelevant to the study of intuition is what the thesis
calls the argument of irrelevance. (IA)4
Let us use the paper “Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style”, the studies of Machery
et al. (2004) on the theories of reference, as an example. The aim of the studies is
to find if there are any differences of intuition on theories of reference between
Western and Eastern groups of subjects. In the studies, Machery et al. set four
thought experiments according to the form of Kripke’s Gödel case and Jonah case,
and survey the undergraduates from Western and Eastern cultural backgrounds.
Here is one of the vignettes they used in the survey:
“Suppose that John has learned in college that Gödel is the man who
proved an important mathematical theorem, called the incompleteness
of arithmetic. John is quite good at mathematics and he can give an
accurate statement of the incompleteness theorem, which he attributes
to Gödel as the discoverer. But this is the only thing that he has heard

4

Note that the argument of irrelevance (IA) is an important component of this thesis, which will
mainly be used in part II. For convenience, the thesis will abridge the term to IA in the later chapters.
18

about Gödel. Now suppose that Gödel was not the author of this theorem.
A man called ‘Schmidt’ whose body was found in Vienna under
mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in
question. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and
claimed credit for the work, which was thereafter attributed to Gödel.
Thus he has been known as the man who proved the incompleteness of
arithmetic. Most people who have heard the name ‘Gödel’ are like John;
the claim that Gödel discovered the incompleteness theorem is the only
thing they have ever heard about Gödel. When John uses the name
‘Gödel’, is he talking about:
(A) the person who really discovered the incompleteness of
arithmetic? or
(B) the person who got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for
the work?” (Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & Stich, 2004, p. 7)
In the studies, the subjects are asked to choose between the descriptivist
theories of reference (A) and the causal-historical theories of reference (B). For the
purpose of analyzing the data, each response consistent with the causal-historical
theories of reference was given a score of 1, otherwise it was given a score of 0. The
scores were summed up, and the results are shown in Table 1 in below.
19

Gödel cases
Western participants
Chinese participants
Jonah cases
Western participants
Chinese participants

Score (SD)

Machery et al. believe the

1.13 (.88)
.63 (.84)

results reveal a significant difference
in the intuition of theories of

1.23 (.96)
1.32 (.76)

reference between Western and

Table 1 The results of experiments from Machery et al.

Chinese subjects on the Gödel cases.

(2004) Mean scores for experiment 1 (SD in parentheses)

Although there seems to be no
significant differences between two groups of subjects on the Jonah cases, they
believe the results showed that there is probably a variation of the intuition of
different groups of subjects.
How Machery et al. explain the lack of significant differences between two
groups of subjects in the Jonah cases? They explain the results by claiming that the
thought experiments may be too long and too complex for the subjects to attend to
the relevant materials in the vignettes. This explanation has cast doubt on the
results of experiment in Jonah cases, but the explanation could not apply to Gödel
cases, since the Gödel cases, as adduced above, are considerably shorter and
simpler cases than Jonah cases. Assume that Machery et al. give the right
explanation to the insignificant results in Jonah cases. Could we simply ignore the
results of Jonah cases and take the results of Gödel cases as the evidence of the
variability of intuition in different cultural groups?
20

There are still, unfortunately, several worries to the interpretation of the
results and the methodology of the studies on Gödel cases. Both Ludwig (2007, p.
150) and Deutsch (2009) suspect that there is misunderstanding of the subjects to
the thought experiments since there are possibly two interpretations for the
questions of the thought experiments. When the experimenters ask “when John
uses the name ‘Gödel’, who is he talking about?”, the subjects can interpret the
question as “to whom does John intend to refer when he uses ‘Gödel’?” or “to
whom does the name, ‘Gödel’, refer when John uses it?”. The ambiguity of the
semantic reference and the speaker’s reference of the term may make differences
between the responses of the subjects from different cultures. (Deutsch, 2009, p.
454) In the studies, we are interested in intuitive feelings on the exact same
proposition. If the different response patterns are only due to different
understandings of the question, it cannot be evidence for the variability of intuition
of different groups of subjects.
Moreover, Sosa (2005) points out that the design of the survey may also
prevent the experimenters from eliciting the intuitive feelings of the subjects.
Although Sosa is arguing against other studies from Weinberg, Nichols and Stich
(2001), the studies of Machery et al. have a similar flaw. In the thought experiments,
the subjects can only choose between the descriptivist theories of reference and
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the causal-historical theories. There is no third choice for the subjects. The subjects
may possibly not have any feelings on the thought experiments, but be forced to
choose one of the answers given. It is not feasible to interpret these responses as
the intuitive feelings of the subjects and the results of the studies probably cannot
reflect the intuition of the subjects.
Furthermore, Ludwig (2007) contends that there are many other factors that
could prevent the experimenters from eliciting intuitions in response to the exact
same targeting vignette of the subjects. For example, the subjects may have
different understandings of the task and the vignettes because the survey is not
conducted in the subjects’ first language. The subjects may have different
background beliefs. Some of the subjects may not pay enough attention to the
experiments and may give a random answer to the experimenters. It is also possible
for the subjects to worry about how their responses are taken in some other cases.
For example, it is possible for psychopaths to judge transgressions more severely
but not according to their intuitive feelings, since they are motivated to show that
they are ready to go back to society. (Blair, 1995, p. 23)
All of the factors mentioned above possibly enlarge the gap between the
targeted intuitive feelings and the responses of the subjects. The factors prevent
the experimenters from inferring intuitive feelings from the responses of the
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subjects. Is there anything worse than this? Yes. Even if we can ensure the
responses truly reflect the intuitive feelings of the subjects, the results do not
necessarily reflect the ‘real’ intuition for some of the advocates, which they believe
is what we should pursue. The advocates emphasize it is possible to have a gap
between intuitive feelings and ‘real’ intuition, not only between the responses and
intuitive feelings of the subjects. Differences between the notions of responses,
intuitive feelings and ‘real’ intuition would be clearer by considering two examples.
Suppose a subject has certain intuitive feeling to a vignette, but he/she
misunderstands the question and gives a response that hardly reflects what he/she
feels at that time. It counts as a gap between responses and intuitive feelings.
Compared with another case that a subject makes the judgment according to
his/her intuitive feeling to a vignette, but he/she makes the judgment while he/she
feels angry or disgust. Some philosophers believe the feeling of the subject at that
time cannot truly reflect what the subject’s ‘real’ intuition is to the vignette. It
counts as a gap between intuitive feelings and intuition.
In order to express the ‘real’ intuition, the subjects have to make judgments in
high quality cognitive conditions. Some advocates believe the subjects need to have
competence with the involved concepts.5 It is hard to ensure this if we use the

5

To have competence with a concept is, in Bealer’s words, to ‘possess a concept determinately’.
What is meant by ‘possess a concept determinately’? Bealer says “A subject possesses a concept in
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third-person approach in studying intuition. Therefore, on Ludwig’s way of thinking,
the only plausible way of studying intuition is the first-person approach. Using any
results from the third-person approach to argue against intuition seems to be unfair
to the advocates of intuition.
This ‘real’ intuition argument seems to suggest ‘successfulness’ as a
component of intuition. The philosophers who use this argument seem to be
sympathetic with the idea that once intuition is elicited under high quality cognitive
conditions, it is rare (or impossible) for intuition to go wrong.6 For now let us set
aside this radical thought; the thesis will argue against the success conditions of
intuition in part II.
I am sympathetic with the philosophers who doubt the validity of the
third-person approach to some extent: the data from the surveys sometimes are
not plausibly interpreted as intuitive feelings of the subjects. There is anecdotal
evidence from my own findings. I have translated the vignettes from the paper of
Machery et al. into Chinese7, expressed to nearly thirty people and asked for their

the full sense iff (i) the subject at least nominally possesses the concept and (ii) the subject does not
do this with misunderstanding or incomplete understanding or just by virtue of satisfying our
attribution practices or in any other weak such way.” (Bealer, 1998, p. 222) Likewise, a subject is in
high quality cognitive conditions if he/she is free from misunderstanding.
6
Ludwig believes ‘real’ intuition at least reveals the psychological truth in oneself, “a conceptual
truth is any truth knowledge of which is attainable on the basis of competence in deploying the
concepts involved in it.” (Ludwig, 2007, p. 133) Bealer believes that ‘real’ intuitions have a strong
modal tie to the truth. He says “x determinately possesses a given concept iff, for associated test
property identities p: x would have intuitions which imply that p is true iff p is true.” (Bealer, 1998, p.
225)
7
I have attempted to ask people to response to the original vignettes in English, but most of them
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answers on two-forced choice questions and opinions. Although the results of
two-forced choices seem to support the expectation of Machery et al., the
post-answer opinions from the people seem to confirm what Deutsch, Sosa and
Ludwig guess. One person reports that he chooses the descriptivist responses
because the vignettes emphasize the protagonists “only know” something about
Gödel and Tsu Ch’ung Chih. He seems to believe that this information for the
protagonists must be relevant to the answers and thus chooses the descriptivist
answers. Another person reports that she thinks that both answers in the Gödel
cases are acceptable, so she just randomly chose the descriptivist answer; there are
four other people who spontaneously report that they need a third choice instead
of choosing between causal-historical theory and descriptivist theory. They tell me I
should add a choice like ‘no comment’ or ‘both answers can be accepted’. More
interestingly, although I have extremely careful translation on the question “when
John uses the name ‘Gödel’, who is he talking about?” to avoid misunderstanding
that the question is not asking for the speaker’s reference, two people still report
that they think the question is asking for what John intends to refer to.
It is apparently inappropriate to interpret the responses of these people as
reflecting their intuitive feelings. However, if we leave out the responses that are
quickly lose their interest and refuse to respond. Although the universities in Hong Kong are English
speaking universities, it is still important to translate the materials of the survey to the first language
of the participants.
25

hardly treated as the intuitive feelings we are interested in, the results of the
informal survey then become less significant and uninteresting. I suspect that the
participants of Machery et al.’s survey have similar feelings. It is quite doubtful
whether the results can truly reflect the intuitive feelings of the subjects.
There are several other worries that the third-person approach may face in
studying intuitive feelings. Participants may not understand the technical terms
used in the vignette well and give the answer under misunderstanding, for example
the terms ‘laws of nature’ and ‘current state’. (Nichols & Knobe, 2007, p. 667) It is
also possible that participants give the answer near the midpoint because of their
uncertainty about the task. (Nagel, 2011, p. 24) If a survey targets only
undergraduates or the folk, this can also possibly cause a systematical error in
survey. It is unclear that whether we can generalize the results from these studies
as reflecting the intuitions of professional philosophers. (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993,
p. 625; Ludwig, 2007) Some philosophers thus suggest that we have to study
intuition by merely using first-person approach. Since we know about how we feel
better than others feel, we may be the best interpreters for the feelings of us. Many
of the worries in studying intuition mentioned above could probably ward off by
using the first-person approach.
Clearly the survey has the limitations in eliciting and studying intuition.
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However, it seems inapposite to recklessly banish the use of the third-person
approach in studying intuition. As mentioned in 1.2.1, the target of this thesis is
specified as immediate striking feelings. It is unclear why this target is impossible to
be studied by the third-person approach.
There are numerous techniques of the third-person approach that can prevent
the responses of the subjects from being affected by misunderstanding or the
setting of the survey in general. For example, avoiding using technical terms in the
expression of vignettes; asking participants to justify their answer in a few
sentences; random assignment of the participants to prevent systematic differences
from the unrelated variables; exclusion of participants who guess the hypothesis of
the experiments to prevent the participants giving the answers which the
experimenters expected; using a Likert scale or adding a third choice in the survey
instead of only two choices, to prevent forcing the participants to choose an answer
which does not best reflect their intuitive feelings; using the back-translation
method to translate the vignettes into the first language of the subjects to prevent
the subjects from misunderstanding or losing interest in the vignettes.
By applying these techniques to the third-person approach generally, we
probably can avoid misinterpretation for the intuition of the subjects, although the
experimenters have to bear that it is more difficult for the survey to have significant
27

results. Deutsch (2009) and Stich (2012) also note that by having better clarification
of the involved concepts and control of the factors, it is possible to avoid the
ambiguities and elicit the responses which we are really interested in.
In fact the first-person approach also has some obstacles in studying intuition.
When using the first-person approach in studying intuition, it is possible for the
philosophers to erroneously ignore some factors causing the feelings they have and
to give a bad explanation for them. For example, in one of the studies from Lewicki
(1985), participants are arranged to have an unpleasant communication with one of
the experimenters. There is a significant tendency that the participants choose to
avoid contact with that experimenter in the later section of the experiment.
Interestingly, when the participants are asked to explain their choice of avoiding
that experimenter, they explain the behavior as a random choice. The implication is
that even if we clearly notice we made a certain choice or had certain feelings, we
may still possibly give a bad explanation or a false reason why the feelings are
elicited. (See also (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson & Stone, 1985; Wilson & Brekke,
1994))
The findings from psychology that it is common for human thoughts to be
prone to have bias may make us less confident in the first-person approach of
studying intuitions. It is found that there is a tendency for some people to
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over-ascribe knowledge of an outcome to a protagonist if they know the results
first; this is known as hindsight bias. (Fischhoff, 1975) Some people are prone to the
fundamental attribution error, a tendency to ignore the influence from the
environment and over-attribute behavior to the character or personality of the
protagonist. (Ross, 1977) More importantly, some people are found to have
confirmation bias. People tend to search for evidence supporting their preferred
view. They often stop searching if they can find a few pieces of evidence, even if
that evidence is bad evidence. (Haidt, 2001) Because of these biases in human
thought, it seems also reasonable to question the accuracy of first-person
description and explanation of intuitive feelings.
The possibility of confusing the source of memory also poses a threat to the
first-person approach in studying intuitions. It is found that the source of memory
can sometimes be easily confused. To illustrate, here is a short story of Donald
Thomson from Baddeley:
“Australian eyewitness expert Donald Thomson appeared on a live TV
discussion about the unreliability of eyewitness memory. He was later
arrested, placed in a lineup and identified by a victim as the man who had
raped her. The police charged Thomson although the rape had occurred
at the time he was on TV. They dismissed his alibi that he was in plain
29

view of a TV audience and in the company of the other discussants,
including an assistant commissioner of police. The policeman taking his
statement sneered, ‘Yes, I suppose you've got Jesus Christ, and the Queen
of England, too.’ Eventually, the investigators discovered that the rapist
had attacked the woman as she was watching TV - the very program on
which Thompson had appeared. Authorities eventually cleared Thomson.
The woman had confused the rapist's face with the face that she had
seen on TV.” (Baddeley, 1982, p. 133)
It is also found that memory can be confused with imagination. (Finke,
Johnson, & Shyi, 1988) Note that memory should be distinguished from intuition;
the intuitive feelings we are interested in should not be merely recalling of our
memory, since intuitive feelings are able to respond to new cases. (2.2) Using the
first-person approach, it is possible to misidentify memory as the intuitive feelings
the subject has, which seems also to create difficulty for studying intuition by
first-person approach.
Thus the first-person approach does not have as many advantages over the
third-person approach as Ludwig thinks. However, the paper is not going to suggest
that we give up the first-person approach in studying intuition. For now, there
seems to be no perfect approach to studying intuition. The paper suggests that we
30

should also take the third-person approach into consideration, since there seem to
be no better choices if we want to start our studies on intuition.
In the paper of Weinberg (2007), he makes a distinction between hopeful and
hopeless sources of evidence. For a source of evidence to be hopeful, it is not
required that the source be infallible, but only that it be possible for the errors to
be detected and corrected. If a source of evidence is hopeful, it is reasonable for us
to believe it even if it is not perfect. Weinberg seems to be right on this point, and it
seems the third-person approach of studying intuition is hopeful and thus trustable.
We should not ignore the efforts the experimenters currently put into their studies
in avoiding misunderstanding, for example when they ask additional questions in
the survey to ensure the participants understand the task. In studies surveying
children, the experimenters sometimes mail the questionnaires to parents of
participants to avoid misinterpretation of the responses of children. (Repacholi &
Gopnik, 1997) As most studies have implemented enough controls to warrant at
least some degree of confidence in their results, it seems unreasonable to reject
the studies as evidence reflecting intuitive feelings.
In the following chapters, the thesis will select and use the studies from
psychology and experimental philosophy as evidence for the features of intuitive
feelings. If the studies are conducted in a good way, the paper will assume the
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responses from the participants reflect their intuitive feelings. Although the
third-person approach may still not be perfect in studying intuitions, it is believed
that the studies will continuously progress in the understanding of intuition, and
our good candidates for theories of intuition should be able to revise according to
the results newly found by future research.
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Chapter 2: The Features of Intuition
Following the plan given in the introductory part, this chapter aims at
providing a list of the features of intuition as the ground for selecting good theories
in the later part. The thesis will argue that (2.1) fallibility; (2.2) novelty; (2.3)
particularity; (2.4) plasticity; (2.5) variability; and (2.6) heterogeneity are the
features of intuition. What these features mean will be explained and elaborated in
turn in the following sections. If it is true that, as this chapter will attempt to argue,
intuition really has the features listed above, then good explanations for these
features would be the desiderata for a good theory of intuition. Therefore, these
features can serve as the criteria for selecting good theories of intuition in part II.
There are two strategies in play in the following to argue that (2.1) – (2.6) are
really the features of intuition. The first strategy is (i) to show that these features
are uncontroversial in philosophy, by (a) inquiring into the philosophical discussion
of intuition, in order to find if a feature of intuition is directly admitted by a number
of philosophers who are holding different views; or by (b) looking into the common
practice in philosophy.8 If it is found that a feature of intuition is uncontroversial in
philosophy, a good theory of intuition seems to need to explain the feature well, or
8

Herman Cappelen in his book Philosophy without Intuitions (2012) seems to play a similar strategy
of looking into the common practice in philosophy. Cappelen first characterizes the features of
‘intuition’, then claims that in the common practice of philosophy our usage of ‘intuition’ lacks those
features, and thus concludes that there is no such practice in philosophy of appealing to intuition at
all. I am not convinced that the features that Cappelen listed are the uncontroversial features of
intuition. This thesis aims to motivate a competing account of the central features of intuition.
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give a strong reason for rejecting the feature.
As mentioned in 1.2.4, the thesis accepts both first-person and third-person
approaches in studying intuition. The second strategy is simply (ii) to use the results
of psychological studies as support. The results of psychological studies may reveal
some interesting features in the responses of the subjects. The thesis will assume
the results also reveal some interesting tendency of the subjects’ intuitive feelings
and suggest certain features for intuitive feelings. As it is assumed that
‘philosophical intuition’ is ‘intuitive feelings’ in the thesis, a good theory of intuition
in the thesis has to (a) explain the features suggested by psychological studies; or (b)
at least give a good explanation of why the experiments have such and such results.

There are several other things worth noting here before the discussion of any
particular features of intuition. First, it has to be noted that the list of features
(2.1) – (2.6) is not gained from analysis of the notion of intuition, but is argued for
by viewing them as a matter of fact. Someone may then worry why a good theory
must explain these features, but as the thesis noted in 1.2.2, the theories we are
seeking are good and valuable theories. If these features are really general
tendencies of our intuitions, as the thesis will argue in the later sections, then it
seems that a good theory needs to offer explanation for these important features.
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Second, the list of features is only the preliminary list for the features of
intuition, generated from the current studies and self-observation in a limited time.
The list of features is possibly incomplete. This list of features is open to
modification; the members in this list can be freely withdrawn or added, by using
the strategies (i) and/or (ii) mentioned above, without posing any threat to this
thesis. Although it is possible that this list of features is incomplete, the features
seem to at least have enough prima facie plausibility that a good theory of intuition
must address them or explain them away. Thus the list of features could be the
criteria of selecting good theories of intuition.
Third, since the target of this thesis is most kinds of philosophical intuition, the
features in the list should be generally revealed in most kinds of intuition, not
merely in a certain type of intuition, for example epistemic intuition. Otherwise the
feature is not a feature of intuition but a feature of epistemic intuition only, which is
not the target we are mainly interested in. For the same reason, the general theory
of intuition should be able to give an explanation for the features in the most kinds
of intuition, not merely in a certain type of intuition. The aim of this thesis is
selecting the good general theories of intuition, not in selecting the good theories
of epistemic intuition.
Fourth, the features listed above are not completely distinct features.
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Sometimes the features may overlap each other. It is possible for the same study to
give evidence for several features of intuition. For example, the thesis will argue
that variability (roughly, different groups of subjects may have different intuitive
feelings on the exact same vignette/proposition) is a feature of intuition. The
results of psychological studies supporting the view that variability is a feature of
intuition may also be related to fallibility, another feature of intuition that intuition
may sometimes go wrong. In this case, the thesis will mention the psychological
studies in the section of the feature that is most relevant, but note that some
researches are in fact support for several features and some of the features are
inter-supported.
The last thing that has to be noted here is that the thesis will make careful use
of the terms ‘intuition’, ‘intuitive feelings’ and ‘responses’. For the term ‘responses’,
the thesis uses it to refer to the utterances or written responses given by the
subjects in psychological studies. For the term ‘intuitive feelings’, the thesis uses it
to mean the immediate, striking feelings of the subjects. The thesis uses the term
‘intuition’ in describing the discussion in philosophy, but please note that in the
thesis it is believed that ‘intuitive feelings’ is ‘intuition’ in the philosophical sense.

36

2.1 Fallibility
The first feature of intuition the thesis introduces is fallibility. It simply means
that the contents of intuition, or intuitive feelings, can possibly be false.
In recent philosophical discussions, although there are numerous disputes
over intuition, for example the degree of reliability intuition has and the role of
intuition in philosophy, there are still some features that most philosophers
generally accept. Fallibility seems to be one of those uncontroversial features for
intuition. Not only the opponents, but also the advocates of appealing to intuition
accept that fallibility is a feature of intuition, even for the philosophers who believe
in a priori intuition, and for the radical advocates of intuition. For example:
“*I+ntuitions are not infallible evidence about that personal concept.”9
(Goldman, 2007, p. 15)
“*I*ntuitions can (at least occasionally) be mistaken.” (Bealer, 1992, p.
104)
“Actually, we have long known of the fallibility of apparent rational
intuition, even in the best conditions of alertness, normality, and
reflection time.” (Sosa, 1998, p. 261)

9

For Goldman, intuitions are basic evidence concerning one’s own psychological concepts or tacit
theories, concerning only the psychological truth in one self, but not the objective truth. (Pust, 2000,
p. 252; Nagel, 2007, p. 802) Goldman believes that due to false beliefs or misunderstanding, it is
possible for the subjects’ intuition to inaccurately reflect the subjects’ own concepts.
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It is apparent that the advocates admit, at least ostensibly, that intuition is
fallible, even when the subjects generate the intuition under good cognitive
conditions. One of typical examples of fallible intuition in philosophy is the intuition
on the naïve comprehension axiom. Some advocates of appealing to intuition admit
they have this intuition, but they clearly mention that they believe the naïve
comprehension axiom is wrong. Many linguists also argue that we generally have
false intuitions that garden path sentences like ‘the old man the boat’ and ‘the
horse raced past the barn fell’ are grammatically wrong. We also seem to have a
false intuition that the series of natural numbers 1,2,3,4,5 … has more members
than the series of odd numbers 1,3,5,7,9 … In fact both series have the same
number of members.

The advocates, however, are in fact not interested in whether intuition is
fallible. What the advocates really interested in is whether intuition is acceptable as
evidence. The recent disputes in philosophy on the related aspect mainly focus on
the reliability of intuition and the evidential value of intuition in the justification of
beliefs. There are studies from experimental philosophy which suggest that
intuition is unreliable on some occasions, and there seems to be no good way for us
to distinguish bad intuition from good intuition. Some experimental philosophers
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then conclude intuition is better not treated as evidence. Some advocates argue for
intuition by pointing out that intuition, despite its fallibility, is in fact reliable
enough to be treated as evidence. For example, Ernest Sosa (1998) makes the
analogy between intuition and perception. He argues that intuition should have a
similar evidential status as perception. These advocates believe intuition should be
acceptable as evidence just like perception.
These issues are controversial and well-discussed by many philosophers. Thus
this thesis will not repeat their arguments or take any stance on the acceptability of
intuition as evidence. The thesis does not aim at getting into these complicated
disputes. The thesis rather aims at seeking a ground of consensus to continue our
discussion on intuition. Therefore, it will avoid getting into the disputes on the
degree of reliability of intuition and making any normative statement on intuition.
The thesis will gather the features of intuition that philosophers generally
accept and/or the psychological findings suggest. Fallibility, but not acceptability, is
one of the good candidates for these features. Both the advocates and opponents
clearly accept that the intuition is sometimes mistaken and the focus of discussion
is shifted from the fallibility itself to the acceptability as the evidence seems to
suggest this feature is generally accepted in philosophical discussion.
To avoid misleading, it is worth reminding that there are philosophers (e.g.
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(Bealer; Ludwig)) who believe certain intuitions are infallible. These philosophers
make the distinction between ‘intuition’ and ‘real’ intuition (or for Ludwig the ‘ipso
facto intuition’). They argue that the latter is infallible since ‘real’ intuition requires
the subjects to make judgments under reliably high cognitive conditions. These
arguments will be examined in chapter 3.1. Nevertheless, even if these
philosophers desire the infallibility of ‘real’ intuition, they at least accept some
degree of fallibility to ‘intuition’.

It is obvious that there is general acceptance to fallibility of intuition in
philosophy. There is also a large body of psychological studies that find that the
responses of subjects sometimes easily go wrong. It provides evidence that
human’s intuitive feelings are possibly flawed. Typical examples of such studies
would be the studies about the conjunction fallacy, the base rate fallacy and the
Wason selection task. These studies found that sometimes subjects perform poorly
in responding to probabilistic or logical questions.
Consider the conjunction fallacy first. It is clear that it is more probable for a
particular event (e.g. P(A)) to occur than the conjunction of that particular event
and another event to occur (e.g. P(A&B)). However, the studies from Tversky and
Kahneman (1982) find a significant number of subjects falsely judge the opposite.
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For example the famous Linda case:
“Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
demonstrations.” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982, p. 92)
The subjects are asked to rank which of the eight statements for Linda is more
probable. Three of these statements are:
Statement A: “Linda is active in the feminist movement.”
Statement B: “Linda is a bank teller.”
Statement C: “Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist
movement.” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982, p. 92)
Statement A and B is a statement of a particular event (probability to occur is
P(F); P(T)), and statement C is a statement of the conjunction of that two events
(probability to occur is P(F&T)). Many subjects correctly judge statement A is more
probable than statement C. Surprisingly, however, the subjects tend to falsely rank
statement C (P(F&T)) more probable than statement B (P(T)).
There are further studies that found that the subjects’ judgments on
probability are flawed on some other occasions. Consider the base rate fallacy. The
studies ask the subjects to judge:
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“If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false
positive rate of 5%, what is the chance that a person found to have a
positive result actually has the disease, assuming you know nothing about
the person’s symptoms or signs?” (Casscells, Schoenberger, & Grayboys,
1978, p. 999)
More than half of the subjects judge that the probability that the person has
the disease is 95%, but the correct answer is in fact merely 2%, far less than the
answer of most of the subjects.
The Wason selection task also a good example in illustrating the fallibility of
the subjects’ judgments. (Wason, 1966) Suppose we have four cards on a table.
Each card is printed with a number on a side and a letter on another side. The four
cards on the table are now shown 5, 4, A and K (Figure 2). Suppose we are also
interested in testing a proposition that ‘for a card printed with an even number on
one side, its opposite side is printed with a vowel’. Which card(s) we must turn over
to check whether this proposition is true for these four cards?
There is a tendency for the subjects to
judge we must turn over the card printed 4,
Figure 2 An example of Wason selection task.

or both the card printed 4 and the card

printed A. However, the correct answer is that we have to turn over the card
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printed 4 and the card printed K, since only another side of ‘K card’ printed even
number will violate the rule, whether another side of ‘A card’ printed odd number
does not matter.

The second piece of the evidence comes from developmental psychology.
Young children are often found to perform poorly in the false-belief task and the
appearance-reality task. They seem to think the world is transparent to all people
and thus are unable to attribute false beliefs to others or even to themselves. In the
traditional false-belief task, children are told a story of two characters, for example
Sally and Anne. Children are told that Sally has a basket and Anne has a box. Sally
also has a marble. She puts the marble into her basket before leaving the room.
While Sally is outside the room, Anne takes Sally’s marble and puts it into the box.
Children are then asked when Sally is back, where she will look for her marble. The
correct answer on this task is the original place Sally puts the marble (i.e. the basket)
since the protagonist seems not to have a belief that her marble has been moved
by another person. However, children under five seem to have tendency respond to
the task falsely. They often respond that the protagonist will find the correct place
for the marble (i.e. the box) without being able to give a good reason to justify their
belief that the protagonist thinks the marble is in there. The results of the studies
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suggest that children have difficulties in attributing false belief to other people.
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Mossler, Marvin, & Greenberg,
1976; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001)
Young children also perform poorly in the appearance-reality task. In the
studies of Gopnik and Slaughter (1991; Gopnik & Astington, 1988), children aged
between three and five are first shown an object, for example a crayon box.
Children are asked to judge what is contained in the box and most of the children
respond the object is used as its ostensible appearance (i.e. the box contains
crayons). Children are then shown that the object is fake (i.e. the box actually
contains candles). Children are asked to retrieve their past false belief before the
box is opened. Most five-year-old children correctly report that they had a false
belief before the box was opened. However, it is found that significant proportions
of three-year-old children seem to have difficulty in reporting their past false belief.
Three-year-old children seem to believe that they must have had a correct belief in
the past. It seems to suggest that children under five also have difficulties in
ascribing false beliefs even to themselves.
Attribution of false belief is one the important products of our epistemic
intuition in philosophy. The development of children’s thinking on attributing false
beliefs (and also moral judgments, evidence provided in chapter 2.5) countenances
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the fallibility of intuitive feelings on two aspects. First, the studies from
developmental psychology show that children give the false responses in a number
of experiments. The results suggest children have bad intuitive feelings on those
tasks and thus seem to support that the intuitive feelings can possibly be false.
Second, the results show that our intuitive feelings are not innately perfect.
Although these intuitive feelings will be developed over age, the development is
made following our long history of evolution. As evolution more likely leads us to a
larger chance to survive but not to a larger chance to find the truth, it seems more
plausible to assume that these intuitive feelings are still possible to have flaws.
Therefore, developmental psychology seems to provide us good evidence in
thinking that it is possible for intuitive feelings to go wrong.
It is worth noting that there is theory that views epistemic intuitive feelings as
largely related to the feeling of knowing (FOK) and the feeling of another’s knowing
(FOAK) state. (Nagel, 2007) The FOK state is a mental state that one feels he/she
‘knows the answer of a question’, before he/she actually gets the exact answer. One
can have this strong feeling even when he/she is unable to remember the exact
answer of the question. This state is best illustrated by the idiom ‘on the tip of one’s
tongue’. The FOAK state is different from the FOK state, and is a mental state that
one feels regarding whether another person knows something. The confident
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utterance of another person can trigger one’s FOAK state and one will tend to
ascribe knowledge to that person, while avoiding eye contact or some gestures may
prevent one from ascribing knowledge. Both of these states are treated as heuristic
processes that can save our cognitive energy in selecting trustable testimony.
However, the heuristic processes often make the tradeoff between accuracy and
the time in responding. By using cognitive shortcuts, the processes use less mental
resources and respond quicker but make less accurate judgments. For example,
confident utterance does not necessarily correlate perfectly with possessing
knowledge. It is possible for the subjects who use the FOAK state to ascribe
knowledge to make false judgments. If epistemic intuitive feelings really related to
these two states, the theory seems to suggest that the feelings are open to error.

The third piece of evidence comes from the studies on group differences of
responses. These studies will be mainly concerned in the section on variability (2.5),
but the studies also suggest fallibility to a certain extent. Roughly, different
responses from the subjects on the same question seem to suggest some responses
are flawed. In this section, the thesis will only consider the studies from Haidt and
his associates (1993), and leave other studies to the section of variability.
Turiel (1979; 1983) tries to give definitions and make a clear distinction
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between moral and conventional rules. In the early results of studies from Turiel
and his associates, the subjects seem to perform very well in distinguishing moral
and conventional transgressions. The subjects seem to be able to distinguish two
types of transgressions and rules systematically. The differences between moral and
conventional rules, on Turiel’s view, can be summarized as four features. Moral
rules are authority independent, and generalizable over the world. Violation of the
rules will involve a victim and will be more serious than conventional transgressions.
The features of conventional rules are just the opposite of the features of moral
rules.
However, in the later studies of Haidt and his associates (1993), there seem to
be group differences in making the moral/convention distinction. For example,
subjects from different socio-economic status (SES) groups seem to make moral
judgments differently on disgusting behaviors, like the chicken case:
“A man goes to the supermarket once a week and buys a dead chicken.
But before cooking the chicken, he has sexual intercourse with it. Then he
cooks it and eats it.” (Haidt, Koller and Dias, 1993, P. 617)
Haidt et al. find that the subjects in the low-SES group tend to erroneously
judge this kind of disgusting but non-harmful behaviors as moral transgressions.
The low-SES subjects believe the protagonist broke a rule that is authority
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independent and generalizable over the world, which significantly differs from the
judgments of the subjects in high-SES group. Someone may believe that disgusting
behaviors are in fact moral transgressions. However, if the behaviors are moral
transgressions, the high-SES subjects then misjudge the behaviors as merely
conventional transgressions. Either way, the studies from Haidt et al. and also other
studies on group differences of responses seem to suggest the fallibility of intuitive
feelings.
It is evident that it is possible for the subjects to have a tendency to make false
judgments on some occasions. These psychological studies seem to also provide
evidence that the subjects’ intuitive feelings are possibly flawed. As fallibility is an
uncontroversial feature in philosophy and well supported by the psychological
studies, fallibility seems to be a strongly supported feature of intuition.
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2.2 Novelty
Novelty is another feature of intuition the thesis aims to argue. It roughly
means that intuitive feelings are able to respond to new cases. In contrast with
recognition, which is a feeling that is normally not ever generated in response to
novel cases, it seems common for us to have some immediate, compelling feelings
on previously unencountered vignettes. Thus it seems plausible to assume novelty
as a feature of intuition.
Although novelty is believed to be a generally accepted feature in philosophy,
philosophers, unfortunately, seldom have direct discussion of this feature. The only
passage that directly mentions novelty is from Bealer, in a section where he argues
against a reductionist account of intuition that views intuition as merely “a
‘raising-to-consciousness’ of nonconscious background beliefs”. Bealer says this
“proposal also runs into problems with the phenomenon of novelty. At any given
time, there are a number of novel questions about which one has no belief one way
or the other (even a nonconscious background belief) but about which one would
have a clear-cut intuition.” (Bealer, 1998, pp. 209-210) Apart from this passage
suggesting novelty, discussion of this feature is rarely found in philosophy.

Luckily, the common practice of philosophers suggests they have in mind that
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‘intuition’ has the feature of novelty. There are ample examples in philosophy
suggesting that philosophers believe that intuition has the feature of novelty, and
thus novelty seems to be an uncontroversial feature of intuition in philosophy.
It is clear that there are times when we have not encountered a particular
vignette in philosophy, but when the vignette is presented to us, it can elicit our
compelling feelings at first time. Philosophers seem to believe in the novelty
feature of their readers’ feelings. Otherwise it seems less obvious why philosophers
construct new vignettes in supporting their arguments. For example, in A defense of
abortion, in arguing it is morally permissible to have abortion, Thomson (1971)
introduces a violinist case in supporting her argument. The vignette is compelling in
eliciting the readers’ feelings that ‘it is permissible for the protagonist to disconnect
with the violinist’ even they read the vignette for the first time. Similar practice can
be widely found in philosophical discussion, for example in the Gettier case,
Bertrand Russell’s barber case, the trolley case, the twin earth case and the
inhospitable hospital case. If philosophers do not believe the new cases can elicit
the readers’ compelling feelings in supporting their arguments, it seems strange for
philosophers to continuously be giving new cases in their arguments. Therefore, the
common practice for philosophers to continuously use new cases in arguments
gives strong evidence that novelty is a generally accepted feature of intuition in
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philosophy.

It is also rarely found that psychological studies directly examine this feature of
intuitive feelings. Nevertheless, there is discussion of the relation between
‘creativity’ and ‘intuition’10 which seems to indirectly support the novelty of
intuitive feelings. Specifically, if novelty is not a feature of intuitive feelings such
that intuitive feelings are unable to respond to new cases, it seems there is no
natural explanation on how intuitive feelings can link to ‘creativity’, to make
creative process or to generate creative ideas.
There is empirical evidence supporting the link between creativity and
intuitive feelings. In psychology, there are several indicators used in testing the
subjects’ preference on intuitive cognitive style, for example the Myers-Briggs Type
Indicator (MBTI) and Psycho-Epistemological Profile. These two indicators are found
to have a correlation with creativity. In the studies of Hall and MacKinnon (1969),
they survey a number of architects using MBTI. Hall and MacKinnon find that there
is a tendency for highly creative architects to prefer the intuitive cognitive style,
which is the cognitive style that makes judgments quickly and automatically,
compared with the non-creative subjects. In some other studies, it is also found
10

Note that the term ‘intuition’ used here is in the sense employed by psychologists. The term is
used in relatively broader sense than philosophical discussion. The thesis will use ‘intuitive feelings’
in describing psychologists’ views and studies instead to avoid ambiguity.
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that MBTI and Psycho-Epistemological are correlated with Barron-Welsh Art Scale
(BWAS), which is a scale indicating creativity. (Hill, 1987-1988)
In a more recent research, Raidl and Lubart (2000-2001) also aim at studying
on the correlation between intuitive cognitive style and creativity. In order to
measure subjects’ preference for using the intuitive cognitive style, Raidl and Lubart
use two questionnaires and two tasks for testing intuitive behaviors. In two
questionnaires, the subjects are asked to self-evaluate their preference for rational
or intuitive cognitive style and to choose the responses of particular situations
between rational or intuitive behavioral pattern. In the tasks of testing intuitive
cognitive style, the subjects are asked to perform certain tasks, for example
grouping different given objects, and the subjects’ performances are then given a
score by the judges in measuring the subjects’ preference for intuitive cognitive
style.
The results find that the score on one of the questionnaires is significantly
correlated with the performance of the subjects in several creativity tasks, for
instance, a task asks the subjects to suggest methods of escaping from a high tower
by using a short cord. The results seem to suggest a correlation between intuitive
cognitive style and creativity, and thus also indirectly suggest the novelty feature of
intuitive feelings.
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However, there are at least two worries about these studies. The first worry is
on the validity of the MBTI and Psycho-Epistemological Profile in measuring the
preference of intuitive cognitive style. It is also doubtful whether these two scales
are totally independent from creativity. If the scales are in fact also testing creativity,
it is unsurprising that highly creative subjects get higher scores on these two scales.
Besides, in the study of Raidl and Lubart, the only significant correlation they found
is the subjects’ self-evaluation and the performance of tasks in testing creativity.
The results suggest the correlation between the preference of intuitive cognitive
style and creativity, but it probably needs more empirical evidence to show that
there really is such correlation.

Although philosophical discussion and psychological studies do not provide a
large amount of support for novelty, at least it does not seem to be a feature of
intuition that has attracted attacks. Philosophical common practice that
philosophers often use new cases in arguing seems to strongly and sufficient
support that novelty is a generally accepted feature for intuition. Thus it seems
better for a theory of intuition to be compatible with this feature.
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2.3 Particularity
Intuitions in response to particular cases serve as the data for philosophy.
Philosophers should organize the compelling intuitions into a coherent system, and
build up theories according to the intuitions. This method, namely the method of
cases, is believed by many to be the right way to construct theory in traditional
philosophy. (Russell, 1912; Lewis, 1973) For example, Bertrand Russell describes
how we do philosophy:
“Philosophy should show us the hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs,
beginning with those we hold most strongly, and presenting each as much
isolated and as free from irrelevant additions as possible. It should take
care to show that, in the form in which they are finally set forth, our
instinctive beliefs do not clash, but form a harmonious system. There can
never be any reason for rejecting one instinctive belief except that it
clashes with others; thus, if they are found to harmonize, the whole
system becomes worthy of acceptance.” (Russell, 1912, p. 25)
Recently, although it is controversial whether the method of cases is the right
way of doing philosophy (Cummins, 1998; Kornblith, 2006; Cappelen, 2012), the
discussion of this method at least gives us some insight into what philosophers
possibly believe. It seems possible that philosophers who have in mind that we are
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doing philosophy by the method of cases may start forming this belief from their
observation on the phenomenology of intuitive feelings, namely the particularity of
intuitive feelings.
The thesis intends to emphasize the distinction between two senses of
particularity. In one sense, intuitive feelings are attributed the feature of
particularity since (Pa1) intuitive feelings seem to be more easily elicited by
particular cases but not by general principles. In another sense of particularity, (Pa2)
it seems easier for us to have intuitive feelings with particular contents but not with
general contents. Take the Gettier case and Gettier intuition as an example; it is
possible for our intuitive feelings to be elicited by the Gettier case (which is a
particular case) but with the general content that ‘JTB is not sufficient for the
definition of knowledge’. This example supports Pa1 but discourages us from
believing in Pa2. Conversely, it is also possible for our intuitive feelings to be elicited
by considering the general principle that ‘JTB is not sufficient for the definition of
knowledge’ but with particular content that a certain protagonist in a hypothetical
case does not have knowledge. This example discourages us from believing in Pa1
but supports Pa2.
It is worth noting here that particularity is not a necessary feature for intuitive
feelings in the sense that it is still possible for intuitive feelings to be elicited by
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general principles or with general contents. Particularity is an interesting feature
worth explaining since it seems there is a tendency for our intuitive feelings to be
elicited by particular cases or with particular contents. If it is generally accepted
that our intuitive feelings have this feature of particularity, it seems a good theory
needs a good explanation of the feature or of why it appears to us that intuitive
feelings have such a feature.
The thesis will argue for both types of particularity as features of intuitive
feelings. Let us begin with the first type of particularity (i.e. (Pa1) intuitive feelings
seem to be more easily elicited by particular cases but not by general principles).

The thesis first investigates the discussion and the common practice in
philosophy in supporting Pa1. In different theories of intuition, the discussion of
philosophers more or less implies that they believe intuition has the feature of Pa1
to a certain extent. For example, although Bealer clearly mentions he has an
intuition on the naïve comprehension axiom, he also emphasizes that intuition
elicited by particular cases is one notable type of intuition. He says:
“*The fallibility of intuition] pale by comparison with a positive fact,
namely, the on-balance agreement of elementary concrete-case intuitions
among human subjects. Indeed, the on-balance agreement among our
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elementary concrete-case intuitions is one of the most impressive general
facts about human cognition.” (Bealer, 1998, pp. 213-214)
The theories held by Alvin Goldman, Frank Jackson and Michael Devitt also
seem to imply they believe Pa1 is a feature of intuition. Goldman, for example,
believes that what we mean by ‘philosophical intuition’ is the classification or
application intuition, which is “*the+ intuitions about how cases are to be classified,
or whether various categories or concepts apply to selected cases. [emphasis
added+” ((Goldman, 2007, p. 4) See also (Jackson, 1998; Devitt, 2005; 2006))
Goldman clearly thinks this type of intuition is often elicited by particular cases, as
he says:
“*P+hilosophers routinely consider actual and hypothetical examples and
ask whether these examples provide instances of the target category or
concepts. People’s mental responses to these examples are often called
‘intuitions’.” (Goldman, 2007, p. 1)
Jonathan Weinberg also says:
“In the extant practice of appeal to intuitions as philosophical evidence,
one cites one’s application or withholding of a concept from a given case,
usually a hypothetical one, in defense of (or in order to attack) a
particular philosophical claim.” (Weinberg, 2007, p. 320)
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It seems a number of philosophers believe the practice of appealing to
intuition is application of concepts to particular cases. It is also natural for
philosophers who hold such views to believe that it is more frequent and easier for
intuition to be elicited by particular cases. There seems to be only a few theories
which argue against Pa1 for intuition. One of these theories is from Ernest Sosa. In
Sosa’s early view (1998), he clearly mentions that intuition requires abstractness.
This requirement may seem be seen as anti-Pa1, since it seems that abstract
propositions will mostly be general rather than particular. That Sosa thinks Pa1 is
not a feature of intuition is also supported by his examples of intuition. Most of the
examples he gives are general propositions, like “no sphere is a cube”. (Sosa, 1998,
p. 260) It is clear that the early theory of Sosa is anti-Pa1, which will be discussed in
chapter 3.2. Nevertheless, Pa1, the feature that intuitive feelings are more easily
elicited by particular cases, seems not to be a too controversial feature of intuition
in philosophical discussion.

The common practice in philosophy may be good evidence that Pa1 is not a
controversial feature of intuition. Recall the example in the section of novelty.
Philosophers often support their arguments by novel cases, like the violinist case,
the Gettier case and the inhospitable hospital case. But it seems worth paying
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attention to why philosophers often argue by novel cases, and not by general
principles or theories. If Pa1 is not true, and if general principles are equally likely
to elicit the readers’ intuition to particular cases, it is unclear why philosophers
prefer to use cases in supporting their arguments. It is also rarely found that there
are philosophers who successfully argue for the intuitiveness of their theories, but
there seem to be overwhelming amount of examples that particular cases
successfully elicit the readers’ intuitive feelings. Evidence from the practice in
philosophy seems to strongly suggest that there are a number of philosophers who
would accept Pa1 as a feature of intuition.

There are psychologists who emphasize the essential role that narratives
(particular cases) play in moral development or in making judgments, which could
not be replaced by abstract propositions. (Vitz, 1990) Seymour Epstein mentions
similar views in emphasizing the convincing power of narratives over abstract
disputes, and he seems also believe that “narratives are intrinsically appealing in a
way that lectures on abstract subjects and technical documents are not”. (Epstein,
1994, p. 711) Epstein also makes a reasonable conjecture that the results that
anecdotes in the passage could increase the subjects’ confidence in it are due to
narratives being more convincing than abstract discussion. (Kahneman & Tversky,
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1982)
Unfortunately, the research directly on the link between narratives and
intuitiveness is hardly found. One of these studies is from Nichols and Knobe (2007).
Nichols and Knobe survey the subjects’ view on whether it is compatible for us to
be in deterministic universe but have responsibility for our actions. In the studies,
the subjects are asked to make judgments on both abstract general questions and
particular cases. For example:
General: “In *deterministic universe+, is it possible for a person to be fully
morally responsible for their actions?”
Particular: “In *deterministic universe+, a man named Bill has become
attracted to his secretary, and he decides that the only way to
be with her is to kill his wife and 3 children. He knows that it is
impossible to escape from his house in the event of a fire.
Before he leaves on a business trip, he sets up a device in his
basement that burns down the house and kills his family.
Is Bill fully morally responsible for killing his wife and children?”
(Nichols & Knobe, 2007, p. 670)
The results find that the subjects’ responses are radically different in
answering the two types of questions. In responding to the abstract general
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questions, 86% of the subjects judge that it is not possible for a person in a
deterministic universe to be fully responsible for their actions. On the other hand,
in responding to the particular case, 72% of the subjects make the opposite
judgment that Bill is fully morally responsible for his actions. The results would be
unsurprising if we interpret them as showing that the general questions are asking
for the subjects’ (tacit) theory of morality, while the particular cases elicit the
subjects’ immediate feelings. This interpretation of the results, however, is difficult
to find support for, since it is hard for the experimenters to test the intuitiveness of
the subjects’ responses. There may be further studies on the reflection time and
confidence of the subjects’ on their judgments for both general propositions and
particular cases, but it seems difficult to find empirical evidence in supporting Pa1
of intuitive feelings.
Although Pa1 may lack support from empirical studies, it seems to have
sufficient support from the fact that Pa1 is not a controversial feature of intuition in
philosophical discussion and from the common practice in philosophy. Thus it
seems reasonable to think Pa1 is a feature of intuition.

The feature of intuition that (Pa1) intuitive feelings are easier to be elicited by
particular cases seems to link to the second type of particularity, (Pa2) it seems
61

easier for us to have intuitive feelings with particular contents. As our intuition is
more easily elicited by particular cases, it seems reasonable to assume that it is also
easier for us to have intuitive feelings with particular contents.
Empirical evidence in supporting Pa2 is similarly sparse as Pa1. The evidence
has to be found in the discussion and the common practice in philosophy. Pa2,
however, seems to be a more controversial feature than Pa1, as there are more
philosophers who claim that it is not unusual for them to have intuitions with
general contents, such as the naïve comprehension axiom, ‘no sphere is a cube’ or
even the theories those philosophers are sympathetic to.
As self-reporting, I found myself is harder to have intuitive feelings with
general contents, and thus I am suspicious of the persuasiveness of intuition with
general contents to those philosophers. Jaakko Hintikka seems to have a similar
worry. He also “doubt*s+ that many philosophers can honestly claim to have sharp
intuitions as to which one of the several so-called theories of truth is itself true.”
(1999, p. 134)
The common practice in philosophy may provide support for Pa2 of intuition.
We know that philosophers often use cases in supporting their arguments. These
cases are supposed to elicit the readers’ intuitive feelings in favor of the arguments.
But after offering a case, philosophers often have a sentence or two to link those
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feelings with the views that they intend to argue. Why do philosophers have to do
such a thing if the cases can directly elicit the readers’ intuitive feelings on the
theories? It seems natural for us to think that these feelings are merely concerning
the cases (which are elicited with particular contents), for example, the doctor in
inhospitable hospital case ‘should not cut up the healthy person and give his vital
organs to five other patients’. The feelings are less likely to directly elicit the readers’
feelings on the views they are arguing with more general contents, like
‘utilitarianism is wrong’.
Take the Gettier cases (1963) as an example. Edmund Gettier argues against
the view that the JTB conditions are sufficient conditions for knowledge and he
uses two vignettes in supporting his argument. Both of the vignettes are supposed
to elicit readers’ intuitions with particular contents about the cases that a certain
protagonist does not have knowledge, but not directly on ‘JTB is not sufficient
condition for knowledge’. As he mentions in the conclusion, Gettier seems to think
his conclusion is inferred from readers’ intuitive feelings with particular contents
about the cases, but not directly supported by readers’ intuitive feelings. He says:
“*t+hese two examples show that definition (a) [a version of JTB account for
knowledge] does not state a sufficient condition for someone's knowing a given
proposition. The same cases, with appropriate changes, will suffice to show that
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neither definition (b) nor definition (c) [other versions of JTB account for knowledge]
do so either. *emphasis added+” (Gettier, 1963, p. 123)
It seems common for philosophers to argue for their views in the similar form
to Gettier. They often argue for the intuitiveness of the cases they provided and
point out it seems natural to infer to the views they hold from the feelings on those
cases, but not directly argue for the intuitiveness of their views. If it is equally likely
for intuitive feelings to be elicited with general contents, it seems less clear that
why we have such common practice in philosophy. This common practice in
philosophy seems to suggest Pa2 as a feature of intuition.

Some philosophers may still argue that they often have intuitions with general
contents, for instance, Ernest Sosa seems to believe we have intuition that “2+2=4”,
“no sphere is a cube” and “nothing is numerically self-diverse” (Sosa, 1998, p. 260);
Wisniewski reports that he has strong (though wrong) intuition on “Given a choice,
most people prefer less pain to more pain”, “A person first comprehends an idea
and then decides whether or not it is true”, “Given two options (call them A and B),
if a person prefers option A over option B, then that person should also reject
option B in favor of option A” (Wisniewski, 1998, p. 47); and some philosophers also
claim that they have intuitions on “knowledge entails belief” and “knowing
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something entails that one couldn’t easily have been wrong about it”. (Nagel, 2007,
p. 793) Some philosophers would say they have intuitions with general contents
and these intuitions are often elicited by the general propositions themselves.
Examples seem not hard to find in philosophical discussion. Would these examples
be sufficient to convince us to cast off Pa1 and Pa2?
First, as mentioned above, it seems doubtful whether those philosophers
really have sharp intuitions on those general propositions.
Besides, it has to be emphasized again that Pa1 and Pa2 are not necessary
features for intuition. It is still possible for intuitive feelings to be elicited by general
propositions and with general contents. The features only describe an interesting
phenomenon that it is more common for intuitive feelings to be elicited by
particular cases and with particular contents. It seems we need a fair amount of
counterexamples, at least sufficient to show that it is equally likely for us to have
intuitive feelings with general contents, to cast off both Pa1 and Pa2.
Moreover, it is possible to explain why philosophers have intuition with
general contents in the way compatible with Pa1 and Pa2. It is possible that when
we have intuitions on general propositions, there are some intuitions with
particular contents underlying them. It seems that there are three possible
situations when we have intuitions on general propositions:
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(i) clear negative intuition: when we encounter a general proposition, we
clearly notice that there are counterexamples for the proposition and the details of
the counterexamples. Thus we have strong negative intuitive feelings to the
proposition. For example, when someone says ‘an action is morally right if and only
if it maximizes the happiness’, one may quickly think of a case that it is wrong for a
group of children laugh at a child without the child’s knowledge. Even though
utilitarianism can have a further reply to this case, thinking of the case by itself
causes one’s strong intuitive feelings against utilitarianism at that time. An
antagonist provides a clear counterexample to argue against our beliefs on certain
general propositions seem to elicit our negative intuitive feelings to that
proposition in the similar way mentioned.
(ii) vague negative intuition: it is also possible for us to be unclear on the
details of counterexamples, but to believe there are counterexamples to the
general propositions. In this situation we try to construct counterexamples to the
general propositions in our mind but unsuccessful at filling in the details to the
counterexamples. Thus we have negative intuitive feelings on the proposition but
weaker than the intuitive feelings with clear examples. Using ‘an action is morally
right if and only if it maximizes the happiness’ as example again, one may start to
think of a counterexample and the person believes he/she can construct a
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counterexample for this principle. Even though, unfortunately, the details of
example are unclear, the person is convinced by the cases in his/her mind and thus
have negative but weaker feelings to the propositions.
(iii) vague positive intuition: it is also possible for someone to attempt to find a
counterexamples for a general proposition but fail in all his/her attempts. The
person then believes he/she is unable to find a counterexample for the proposition
and gives up. Thus the person has positive but also weaker intuitive feelings on the
general propositions. It is weaker intuition since it seems if an antagonist provides a
counterexample to the general proposition which the person never think of, the
person’s intuitive feelings probably are altered to the opposite side.
It is unclear whether intuitive feelings on general propositions are as strong
and compelling as some philosophers claim, but it seems possible for what they call
‘intuition’ to be reduced to intuitive feelings on particular cases and thus
compatible with the features of Pa1 and Pa2.

The thesis admits there are intuitive feelings on general propositions elicited
beyond the three situations mentioned above, but they seem to be rare. As long as
it seems less common for intuitive feelings to be elicited by general propositions
and with general contents, a good theory needs an explanation for Pa1 and Pa2.
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2.4 Plasticity
In spite of the general robustness and immediateness of intuitive feelings, it
seems possible for us to have different intuitive feelings on the same case in
different conditions. The thesis will argue that intuitive feelings have the feature of
plasticity, which means intuitive feelings are changeable in their strength or
position on the same case in different conditions.
It must be specified what the thesis means by different conditions here.
Plasticity of intuitive feelings of a person is interesting only if the person has
different intuitive feelings on the same case or proposition even though he/she
makes the judgments under different conditions. The conditions that lead the
subjects to make judgments on different cases and thus have different intuitive
feelings should be excluded from evidence in supporting plasticity. For example,
imposing extensive cognitive load on the subjects may cause some difficulties for
the subjects in understanding the vignettes. The subjects probably understand
differently when they are not imposed with the cognitive load, thus it is not
surprising for them to make different responses on the vignette with exact same
words. This kind of performance error should be excluded from our interest.
However, if the subjects are making judgments when they feel anger or disgust but
their understanding of the case is unaffected, the subjects are responding to the
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same case. Having different feelings here counts as an example supporting
plasticity.

Plasticity is a controversial feature of intuition in philosophy. Experimental
philosophers of course believe that the results of their studies, which will be
discussed below, reflect the feature of ‘philosophical intuition’. Thus intuition seems
to be plastic for them. Some advocates of appealing to intuition, on the other hand,
do not believe the results really reflect intuition they are really interested in. As
intuition seems to them an immediate, striking and robust feeling, some advocates
may even believe it is impossible for intuition to change. Otherwise such feelings
should not be counted as intuition. For example, Bealer emphasizes an important
difference between belief and intuition is the plasticity. Bealer thinks belief is highly
changeable but intuition is not. He believes that our intuition cannot change, even
in strength. He says: “*b+elief is highly plastic; not so for intuition. For nearly any
proposition about which you have beliefs, authority, cajoling, intimidation, and so
forth can, fairly readily, insinuate at least some doubt and thereby diminish to some
extent, perhaps only briefly, the strength of your belief. But seldom, if ever, do
these things so readily diminish the strength of your intuitions … *S+ome people
believe [intuitions] are rather plastic; I do not.” (1998, p. 208) Nevertheless, at the
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same time, Bealer clearly notices that whether intuition is plastic is still a
controversial issue in philosophy.
It seems unlikely to have general agreement on this feature in philosophy. The
evidence will have to be sought from empirical studies. It is worth emphasizing here
that the feature of plasticity means it is possible for intuitive feelings to have
changes. The thesis does not attempt to argue that all intuitive feelings are
changeable.
The first piece of evidence suggesting plasticity is from a large body of studies
in developmental psychology, which are also discussed in the section of fallibility
(2.1). It is found that young children tend to perform poorly in false belief tasks, but
amazingly there is a great development for them in a few years. (Mossler, Marvin, &
Greenberg, 1976; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Gopnik &
Slaughter, 1991; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) Using the task of distinguishing
ignorance and false beliefs as example, Ruffman (1996) designs a task for children
similar to false-belief task: a child and a doll are shown a red and a green candy on
a dish first. The doll then leaves the room. While the doll is outside the room, the
experimenter moves the red candy into a box. When the doll is back, the
experimenter conceals both candies from the sight of the doll. The doll only gets
the message that ‘a candy is moved into the box’. The child is then asked what the
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doll thinks the colour of candy in the box is.
Similar to the false-belief task, children under five seem to think the answer is
transparent to the doll. Thus most of them answer that the doll thinks the candy in
the box is red. Children above seven perform well in this task. Most of them
correctly answer that the doll does not know what the colour of the candy is.
Surprisingly, children aged between five and seven, who seem to already grasp the
notion of false belief, tend to give the answer that the doll thinks the colour of
candy is green.
The results suggest that children have a great development of the notion of
ignorance and false beliefs starting from four. Other tasks also suggest that children
have development on understanding desires of the others. Since these children
have great improvements on their performance on the tasks, it seems reasonable
to think that the intuitive feelings of children dealing with these tasks change within
a few years. It seems to be evidence supporting the idea that it is possible for
intuitive feelings to change.
The findings are, however, possibly to be explained by the fact that young
children are unable to have good understanding of the tasks. If it turns out that
young children’s poor performance due to the misunderstanding of the tasks, it
seems unfair to interpret their improvement of performance as change in intuitive
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feelings.
The studies on adults probably could avert such an objection. In psychological
studies on adults, it is also found that the subjects can have different intuitive
feelings on the same case. An example is the studies on framing decision. It is
possible for the subjects to have diverse feelings on different descriptions (frames)
to the objectively same case. For example, there are two frames of the same case in
a study mentioned by Tversky and Kahneman:
Survival frame
“Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery 90 live through the post-operative
period, 68 are alive at the end of the first year and 34 are alive
at the end of five years.
Radiation Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation therapy all live through
the treatment, 77 are alive at the end of one year and
22 are alive at the end of five years.”
Mortality frame
“Surgery: Of 100 people having surgery 10 die during surgery or the
post-operative period, 32 die by the end of the first year and 66
die by the end of five years.
Radiation Therapy: Of 100 people having radiation therapy, none die
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during treatment, 23 die by the end of one year and 78
die by the end of five years.” (Tversky & Kahneman,
1986, pp. 254-255)
The subjects are asked to choose between the two kinds of medical
treatments. The results find that there are significantly more subjects who choose
radiation therapy in the mortality frame then in the survival frame. However, both
survival and mortality frame are in fact describing objectively the same case. It
seems reasonable to assume that the subjects tend to give different responses if
they are asked to respond under another frame. There are similar studies which
find that the subjects make judgments differently on the objectively same case but
under different frames, for example different response patterns to the problem
considering saving 200 of 600 people or letting 400 of 600 people die (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981), or the choices between 25% fat and 75% lean. (Keren, 2007) As
the subjects respond differently on the different frames of the objectively same
case, it seems reasonable to think that the subjects’ intuitive feelings and thus
judgments are changeable under different frames of the same case.
It is also found that ordering effect could possibly affect subjects’ judgments
on the same vignette. In a study of Swain, Alexander and Weinberg (2008), the
subjects are asked to make judgments on whether the protagonist in the truetemp
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case has knowledge. Truetemp case is a case about a protagonist who has a reliable
ability to unreflectively notice the temperature outside, but he never checks if he
correctly notices the temperature outside. Is he counted as knowing the
temperature? This vignette is expected to elicit readers’ intuitive feelings to judge
that the protagonist does not have knowledge and thus provide support for arguing
against externalism in epistemology. But in the study, the subjects are divided into
different groups and asked four vignettes in different order. In one group the
subjects are asked to judge a clear case of knowledge before judging the truetemp
case. In another group the subjects are asked to judge a clear case of
non-knowledge first. In other groups the subjects are asked to respond other cases
first.
The results show that the subjects have a tendency to ascribe knowledge to
the protagonist in truetemp case if they are asked to judge on a clear case of
non-knowledge first, while the subjects who are asked to judge on a clear case of
knowledge first show the opposite tendency. It seems the ordering of vignettes is
not a factor that seriously affects the subjects’ understanding of the vignettes, but
it seems to be a factor that affects the subjects’ judgments and thus intuitive
feelings. This ordering effect seems also to occur in moral intuitive feelings. The
subjects’ responses may be influenced by merely putting different versions of the
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trolley case first. (Liao, Wiegmann, Alexander, & Vong, 2012) The results seem to
provide support for us to think that it is possible for our intuitive feelings to have
changes.
Cullen (2010) has worries particularly on Swain et al.’s studies. He worries that
the subjects in Swain et al.’s studies misinterpret four vignettes as related and thus
give different responses when they are presented different vignettes first. Cullen
replicates the survey on only two vignettes, truetemp case and a clear case of
non-knowledge in Swain et al.’s studies, and sees whether there is an ordering
effect on these two vignettes. Cullen emphasizes in the instruction of the studies
that the subjects should consider the vignettes independently. The results find that
the subjects have the similar tendency to ascribe knowledge to the protagonist in
the truetemp case in both orders. It seems to be a study suggesting that Swain et
al.’s studies may have some flaws.
However, Cullen’s study may oversimplify Swain et al.’s studies. In his
replication of the studies, Cullen surveys only on two cases, the truetemp case and
a clear case of non-knowledge. But the most significant difference in the subjects’
responses is on the judgments of truetemp case between judging a clear case of
knowledge first and a clear case of non-knowledge first. Judging the truetemp case
first seems not to have such significant difference with judging a clear case of
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non-knowledge first in both Cullen’s and Swain et al.’s studies. To have a fair
replication, Cullen seems to need at least three cases in the survey. Besides,
influence on the subjects’ responses in Swain et al.’s studies may be complicated. It
is natural for Cullen to have different results if he simplifies the studies. But as the
vignette of truetemp case is objectively same case even in different orders, as long
as it is not found that the subjects systematically misunderstand the vignette due to
different orders, it seems to be evidence suggesting that it is possible for our
intuitive feelings on the same case to change.
Wheatley and Haidt (2005) have interesting studies on the subjects’ moral
judgments. In the studies, Wheatley and Haidt hypnotize the subjects to feel
disgust when they read a neutral word like often or take. After the hypnotization,
the subjects are asked to make moral judgments on a series of vignettes. It is found
that when the subjects make judgments on the vignettes that contained the word
for which they are hypnotized to feel disgust, the subjects tend to make more
severe judgments. Again the subjects seem to judge on the objectively same case,
but it seems still possible for them to make different judgments and have different
intuitive feelings under hypnotization.
There are a number of studies give support to the idea that disgust feelings
affect our moral judgments and probably intuitive feelings. (Haidt, Koller, & Dias,
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1993; Nichols & Knobe, 2007; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008) It is also found
that feelings of fear could affect the subjects to make harsher moral judgments.
(Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989) Some other studies
suggest that it is possible for us to think a statement is true merely due to the fact
that the statement seems familiar to us. (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992) We may
also over-ascribe outcome knowledge to the protagonist in the vignette only
because we are told what the outcome turns out to be. This tendency is known as
hindsight bias. (Fischhoff, 1975)
These studies seem to show that it is possible for our judgments of the same
case to be affected under different conditions. The changes of judgments seem not
to be because of misunderstanding. It seems to be strong evidence suggesting that
intuitive feelings are also possible to have changes.
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2.5 Variability
The fifth feature of intuition the thesis intends to argue is variability. Variability,
roughly, means that it is possible for intuitive feelings on the same case to vary
from group to group. It must be emphasized that, similar to plasticity, this feature is
interesting only when the subjects have different intuitive feelings on the same case.
Nothing is interesting if the subjects are making different judgments on different
cases.
Can different groups of people have different intuitions on the same case? It is
still a controversial issue in philosophy. Again experimental philosophers of course
believe the results of studies reflect the existence of group differences in intuition,
while some advocates of intuition believe it is possible for experimental
philosophers’ studies to have flaws. For example, different responses from different
cultures may be explained by misunderstanding of the vignettes due to verbal
disagreement of a concept in the vignettes. (Bealer, 1992; Goldman, 2007; Sosa,
2007b) The argument is discussed in the section of the argument of irrelevance
(1.2.4) and will be discussed in the section of Bealer (3.1) and Sosa (3.2). Therefore
the thesis will not go too deep into the philosophical discussion in this section.

Variability seems to be a controversial feature in philosophy. Evidence has to
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be found in empirical studies. There are ample amount of studies finding that the
judgments of the subjects vary from group to group. The subjects in different
cultural background, age, socio-economic status (SES) or gender groups are able to
have different response patterns to the same question. The variation of responses
in these different groups will be examined in turn.
In psychology, there is a complaint that some studies often have surveys
focusing on subjects that Henrich et al. (2010) termed WEIRD (Western, Educated,
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic), while ignoring subjects from other cultures. It
is interesting to find the variation of responses on various aspects of the subjects
from different culture. For example, Kohlberg (1969) was one of the earliest
psychologists to suggest that young children have development in understanding of
the notion of morality. Children were found to hold a similar moral theory that “acts
that get punished are wrong; acts that get rewarded are good” (Stage 1 and 2) at
first, but they quickly develop to hold the theory that “acts that others approve of
are good; acts that others condemn are bad” (Stage 3) (Haidt, 2001, p. 822), though
some later studies suggest that some young children in fact do not believe in the
theory of stage 1 and 2. (Damon, 1977; Turiel, 1983; Laupa & Turiel, 1986) In some
other studies, it is found that although the WEIRD subjects have a tendency to pass
through those several stages of development, subjects from non-Western cultures
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do not show such a tendency in their responses. (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan,
2010, p. 73)
Moreover, a series of psychological studies consistently suggests that the
subjects from different cultures have different preferences on cognitive style.
Western subjects prefer the formal cognitive style, which is labeled as analytic,
rule-based and relatively slower; while East Asian subjects prefer the intuitive
cognitive style, which is labeled as holistic, experienced-based and relatively faster.
(Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) For
example, in a study of Norenzayan et al. (2002), they ask the European American
and Korean subjects to judge whether an argument is valid on four types of
arguments, namely valid/believable, valid/nonbelievable, invalid/believable and
invalid/nonbelievable arguments. Here the thesis just offers an example of
arguments from the studies:
Valid/nonbelievable
“Premise 1: All things that are made of plants are good for the health
Premise 2: Cigarettes are things that are made of plants
Conclusion: Cigarettes are good for the health” (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim,
& Nisbett, 2002, p. 674)
Even though the conclusion that ‘cigarettes are good for the health’ is
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nonbelievable, the argument is in fact following Modus Ponens and thus should be
valid. To judge this argument as invalid due to the fact that the conclusion is
nonbelievable is known as the belief bias effect. In the study Norenzayan et al. find
that there are significantly more Korean subjects prone to this bias and judge this
kind of nonbelievable valid arguments as invalid. As in the test question
Norenzayen et al. find that Korean subjects make the similar response pattern with
European Americans in judging abstract arguments, it seems two groups of subjects
do not have radically different logical ability. It seems reasonable to view the results
as evidence that shows that the two groups of subjects have different preferences
for different cognitive styles, namely the formal and intuitive cognitive styles.
Furthermore, it is also found that the subjects from different cultural groups
are prone to have different biases. Western subjects are more likely to be subject to
the fundamental attribution error, which is the tendency to overattribute behavior
to the character of a person rather than the influence of environment (Ross, 1977),
while East Asian subjects tend to exhibit hindsight bias, which is the tendency to
believe that a known outcome is unavoidable in retrospect. (Fischhoff, 1975)
As it is possible for subjects from different cultural groups to have radically
different preferences on cognitive styles and to be prone to have different types of
error, it seems natural that the subjects from different cultural groups may also
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possibly have different intuitive feelings on the same question.
Inspired by Nisbett’s psychological studies on cultural differences, Weinberg,
Nichols and Stich look for direct differences of intuition in philosophy. Weinberg et
al. (2001) have a series of surveys on the subjects from different cultural groups.
They asked the subjects to respond to famous thought experiments in epistemology
and find that the subjects in different cultural groups have diverse response
patterns in some of the thought experiments. For example, East Asian or Indian
subjects are significantly more willing to attribute knowledge to the protagonist in
the Gettier case than Western subjects.
There is also a significant difference in responding to Dretske’s Zebra-in-Zoo
case between subjects from different cultural groups. The Zebra case is a case
about a protagonist who successfully recognizes that the animal in the zebra cage is
a zebra, though it is possible that the animal in the zebra cage is a mule that is
painted to look like a zebra. If the animal is in fact a cleverly painted mule, the
protagonist would still identity the animal as a zebra. The subjects are asked
whether the protagonist in this case knows that the animal in the zebra cage is a
zebra. It is found that there is a significantly higher proportion of subjects from the
Indian subcontinent who ascribe knowledge to the protagonist than Western
subjects. The results from Weinberg et al. seem to strongly suggest that it is
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possible for epistemic intuitions between subjects from different cultural groups to
differ.
Let us briefly revisit the argument of irrelevance since it has been deployed
extensively against these studies for variability of intuition. There are other
explanations for the different responses of the subjects in the studies. For example,
Cullen (2010) has reasonable worries that, first, the subjects may misunderstand
the question. The two choices Weinberg et al. give to the subjects are that the
protagonist ‘really knows’ or ‘only believes’ something. Cullen finds that,
surprisingly, the subjects respond differently when they are given the choices that
the protagonist ‘knows’ or ‘does not know’ something, compared with the choice
between ‘really knows’ or ‘only believes’ something. Cullen believes the difference
in response patterns is due to the misunderstanding of the surveyed question. If
the responses of the subjects are merely judged with a misunderstanding of the
question, it seems that the results are not reflecting what we are interested in,
namely the subjects’ intuitive feelings on the vignettes.
Second, Weinberg et al. asked the subjects to respond to a forced-choice
question. Cullen finds that although there is a significant result in a forced-choice
question, it is possible to have completely different results by using Likert scales. If
there is no significant tendency for the subjects’ judgments when using Likert scales,
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it seems inappropriate to interpret the forced-choice results as reflecting that the
subjects have certain intuitive feelings on the vignettes.
Moreover, the studies from Nagel, San Juan and Mar (2013) survey more than
two hundred undergraduate subjects on different types of vignettes in
epistemology, including eight versions of Gettier cases. Nagel et al. find that
although there are variations in responding to different versions of Gettier cases,
the difference seems not to be systematically related to cultural background or
genders of the subjects. It seems to be evidence suggesting that it is possible for
Weinberg et al.’s results to be found due to poor survey conducting method or
accident. It is possible that epistemic intuitive feelings in fact exhibit no cultural
variation.
Stich (2012) directly replies to Nagel’s worries. Nagel suggests Weinberg et al.’s
results may be found due to accident, for example some group of the subjects may
be less interested in answering the philosophical thought experiments. Thus
Weinberg et al.’s results may not truly reflect the subjects’ intuitive feelings on the
vignettes. Stich points out that most of the studies have tried hard to control the
factors, for example, the experimenters emphasize what strategy they want the
participants to use. (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002) As long as there are
feasible controls in the experiments, it seems unreasonable to believe the results
84

do not truly reflect the subjects’ feelings. There are always possibilities that may
prevent us from drawing any interesting conclusion from the results. If these
possibilities could be used in arguing against Weinberg et al.’s studies, it seems the
same argument could also apply to Cullen’s and Nagel et al.’s studies. Stich
complains about Nagel’s strategy of ‘selectively challenging data’. Stich has an
interpretation of Nagel’s practice of dealing with the data from experiments:
“If the data supports my view, all is well. If the data does not support my
view, think up some possibility that, if it obtained would give us a reason
to discount the data. No need to show that that possibility does obtain.
The mere possibility that it obtains is enough to conclude that the data
does not really pose a problem for my hypothesis.” (Stich, 2012, p. 19)
It seems Nagel and Cullen can suggest us to take the results of their studies
into consideration at most, but it seems there should be more evidence for us to
think that Weinberg et al.’s results are totally irrelevant to the epistemic intuitive
feelings.
There are also studies on the cultural variation of moral judgments. One of the
studies is conducted by Haidt, Koller and Dias (1993). Haidt et al. ask the subjects to
evaluate on several harmless but offensive acts, such as cleaning the bathroom
with the national flag, and disgusting acts, such as having sexual intercourse with a
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dead chicken before eating it. Haidt et al. find that in some of the
harmless-offensive acts, the difference of judgments on seriousness of the acts
between high-SES group and low-SES group of subjects is significant in the US, while
subjects in Brazil show less significant difference between different SES groups.
Additionally, children in Brazil and the US also show a different response pattern.
Children in Brazil, in both high- and low-SES group, and low-SES children in the US
tend to judge more severely on harmless-offensive acts than high-SES children in
the US.
The results of the studies mentioned show systematically different response
patterns between the subjects from different cultural backgrounds. It seems
reasonable for us to believe that the subjects from different cultural backgrounds
are able to have different intuitive feelings on some vignettes.

In the same studies (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993), moreover, the results
significantly reveal the different response patterns between the subjects from
high-SES group and low-SES group. The subjects from low-SES group in both Brazil
and the US generally give more severe moral judgments on harmless but offensive
acts than high-SES group of subjects. Low-SES subjects tend to judge that the
harmless-offensive acts are more serious, should be stopped or punished and the
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rules prohibiting such acts should be universalized, while high-SES subjects show
the alternate tendency.
Besides, in the studies of Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001), they also find
that in judging some of the vignettes in epistemology, low-SES subjects seem to be
more willing to ascribe knowledge to the protagonist, compared with high-SES
subjects. The results of systematically diverse response patterns seem to suggest
that it is possible for the subjects from different SES groups to have different
intuitive feelings.

Haidt et al.’s studies also find an age difference of responses in moral
judgments of harmless-offensive acts. Children seem to generally judge more
severely on these acts than adults. Children seem to think harmless-offensive acts
are more serious and the rules prohibiting the acts are universalizable, while adults
seem to be less willing to universalize such rules.
Nichols (2002; 2004) also has similar results in surveying children’s and adults’
moral judgments on some transgressions. They are asked whether a transgression
is permissible, how serious the transgression is, whether the transgression is
permissible if the authority allowed to do so and the reasons why the transgression
is not permissible. It is found that children and adults have different attitudes
87

towards the disgusting transgressions. Children tend to respond that the disgusting
transgressions, for example “Bill is sitting at a dinner party and he snorts loudly and
then spits into his water before drinking it” (2002, p. 229), are not permissible even
if the authority allowed it. The transgressions are more serious than conventional
transgressions and the rule should generalize over the world. On the other hand,
although adults also tend to respond that the disgusting transgressions are more
serious than conventional transgressions and authority independent, but the rules
are not generalizable over the world. It is clear that children and adults have
different response patterns on their moral judgments. The developmental
psychology mentioned in 2.1 and 2.4 also reveals children and adults have different
judgments in ascribing beliefs. Children consistently perform poorly in false belief
task but have great improvement in performance in several years. It seems
reasonable to think that in responding to the same vignette, it is possible for
subjects from different age groups to have different intuitive feelings.

The variability of intuitions is also shown in other aspects, for example, the
gender difference. There are findings that indicate that there may be a radical
gender differences in responding to the Gettier cases. (Buckwalter & Stich, 2011)
The studies from Norenzayan et al. also have an additional finding that females
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tend to use the intuitive reasoning process more than males. (Norenzayan, Smith,
Kim, & Nisbett, 2002, pp. 681-682)
Intuitions may also vary across groups with different psychological
characteristics. In some studies (Nichols, 2002; Nichols & Knobe, 2007), the
experimenters divide the subjects into high and low disgust-sensitivity groups. The
experimenters ask them to judge on the seriousness and authority dependence of
the transgression. The studies find that the subjects in the high disgust-sensitivity
group tend to think the disgusting transgressions are more serious and
independent from authority, while the subjects in the low disgust-sensitivity group
judge differently. In addition, it is found that the subjects with different
psychological traits may have different judgments on whether determinist universe
is compatible with moral responsibility. (Feltz & Cokely, 2009) The results of all
these studies seem to suggest that it is possible for different groups of people to
have different intuitive feelings on the same vignette.

Although a large body of studies suggests that it is possible for subjects from
different groups to give different response patterns, some philosophers may still
believe the results do not necessarily support the variability feature of intuition. As
it is a controversial feature of intuition, a good theory of intuition should either (i)
89

accept and explain the variation of the responses or (ii) demonstrate how the
different response patterns are not reflecting different intuitive feelings of the
subjects, and provide good reason for us to believe in such a possibility. These will
be mainly discussed in chapter 3.
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2.6 Heterogeneity
In traditional discussion of intuition in philosophy, intuition seems to be
assumed to be a cohesive natural kind of mental state. Most philosophical views in
the past tend to have the single capacity conception of intuition. The possibility of
heterogeneity of intuition, which suggests different intuitive feelings may in fact be
generated by diverse psychological processes, is often ignored.
There are a number of philosophers still do not notice or deny such possibility.
(For review see (Nado, 2012)) For example, as we will discuss in the later chapter,
George Bealer seems to assume intuition is a unified mental state. He believes
intuition is “a sui generis irreducible, natural (i.e. non-Cambridge-like) propositional
attitude that occurs episodically.” (Bealer, 1998, p. 213) As in his several papers, he
seems to argue for the reliability of intuition as a whole without noting the
possibility of heterogeneity of intuition, it seems reasonable to interpret his view as
having single capacity conception of intuition.
Joel Pust also seems to have single capacity approach of intuition in his mind.
He believes that intuition is “a distinct kind of mental state with their own
‘intellectual’ phenomenology” (Pust, 2000, p. 31) and “a genuinely basic faculty
distinct from sense-perception, and on no worse initial footing than our other
natural faculties.” (Pust, 2000, p. 119) It seems also reasonable to interpret his view
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as assuming a single capacity approach to intuition.
Nevertheless, as there is an increasing body of studies providing evidence
suggesting the heterogeneity of intuitive feelings, some philosophers clearly take
the possibility of heterogeneity into consideration. For example, one of the specific
theses Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley (2012) hold is that moral judgments are
not unified by brain mechanisms. There are also some experimental philosophers
who carefully restrict their interpretation of their results to only reflect a particular
sort of intuitive judgments, such as epistemic intuition or intuition about reference.
(Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich, 2001; Machery, Mallon, Nichols, & Stich, 2004)
Although heterogeneity is still not a generally accepted feature of intuition in
philosophy, it would not be a controversial feature. As a growing body of empirical
studies supports the heterogeneity of intuition, there are some philosophers who
notice this possibility and seem to agree that a good theory of intuition has to take
this possibility into consideration. (Sosa, 2007a; Weinberg, 2007; Stich, 2012) It is
expected that the heterogeneity approach will get increasing attention and
acceptance in philosophical discussion. It seems that a good theory of intuition
should be capable of explaining the heterogeneity, or at least compatible with this
possibility.
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There is large amount of empirical evidence supporting the heterogeneity
feature of intuitive feelings. This feature is generally revealed on different realms of
intuitive feelings, including mathematics and logical intuitive feelings. (For review
see (Nado, 2012)) In this section, for convenience, the thesis will consider only the
evidence supporting the heterogeneity of moral intuitive feeling. It does not mean
that the heterogeneity feature is an exclusive feature for moral intuitive feelings but
not for intuitive feelings generally.
Moral intuitive feelings seem to dissociate from logical and linguistic abilities.
There is a famous story of Phineas Gage.11 Gage had damage to his ventromedial
portion of the frontal lobes, mainly to his orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and started to
have anti-social behaviors without any impairment to his reasoning or linguistic
abilities. (Damasio, 1994; Dolan, 1999; Singer, 2005) Patients who have impairment
to the same area also show increasing tendency to perform anti-social behaviors.
These patients seem to have normal reasoning abilities, but they are unable to have
apposite emotional responses to lives lost or to endangerment of others. Antonio
Damasio summarizes this situation as “to know, but not to feel.” (Damasio, 1994, p.
45)
Anderson et al. (1999) also reports that two patients who have prefrontal

11

Note that the case of Phineas Gage has been debunked. The thesis only aims to use it to
introduce the selective impairments, but not use it to support heterogeneity.
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damage, particularly to orbitofrontal cortex, in their childhood also show such
anti-social behaviors. In the studies, these two patients perform normally in IQ tests,
which can plausibly be seen as a reasonable measure of logical and linguistic ability,
but are deficient in the ability to make the moral/convention distinction and in
apposite moral reasoning. The moral reasoning of the patients seems to mainly
concern avoiding punishment. (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio,
1999; Dolan, 1999; Greene & Haidt, 2002) The studies from Blair (1995) also
suggest that it is possible for psychopaths who have intact cognitive abilities to be
unable to make the distinction between moral and convention transgressions.
These studies seem to provide evidence for dissociating moral intuitive feelings
from logical and linguistic abilities. The studies seem also to suggest a
heterogeneous approach in considering moral intuition, logical intuition and
linguistic intuition (grammatical and semantic intuitions). (i.e. This approach means
that we have to assess the reliability of different types of intuition separately.)

A second piece of evidence for heterogeneity comes from the activation of
different specific brain regions in making different types of judgments. Although
there are some brain areas that are generally activated in making different types of
judgments, there are still some specific brain areas activated regarding different
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types of judgments. Evidence is provided by the repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation (rTMS) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies.
rTMS is the technique to use pulses to temporarily inactivate certain brain regions,
in order to see whether a temporary lesion of a certain brain area could affect
specific function. The technique of fMRI can help us to notice the activation of
specific brain regions by detecting the flow of blood in the brain. This technique
helps psychologists to identify the link between certain brain regions and specific
functions.
Regarding the realm of linguistics, it is found that two specific brain regions are
related to language expression and interpretation. Paul Broca famously has studies
of patients who have some language expression impairments. He finds that the
patients have similar lesions of a certain area of the frontal lobe. It seems that this
certain area of the brain is largely related to the language utterance, which is called
Broca’s area now. Some linguists (e.g. Chomsky) may have a further conjecture that
“Broca’s area and its closely associated areas (44-47) contain a ‘phyletic’ neural
substrate of language that would account for universal grammar.” (Fuster, 2008, p.
369) In the more recent studies, by using the rTMS, it is found that temporary
inactivation of Broca’s area slows down the utterance of verbs (though it does not
significantly affect the utterance of nouns) of the subjects. (Cappelletti, Fregni,
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Shapiro, Pascual-Leone, & Caramazza, 2008) It is suggested that Broca’s area mainly
concerns the expression of thoughts in the form of speech and signs. (Gerrig &
Zimbardo, 2010)
In addition, Wernicke’s area, which is located in the temporal lobe, is found to
be related to the ability of interpreting written and spoken language. A lesion of
this area is found to affect the understanding of language. (Gerrig & Zimbardo,
2010) These two specific areas seem largely associated with our linguistic abilities
in both expressing and interpreting language. The areas are found to be specific to
our language abilities, which is different from the activation of brain areas in
making logical or moral judgments.
Regarding reasoning ability, humans activate different brain region from
linguistic related areas. There are various different brain regions activated when
making logical related judgments. The prefrontal cortex, which is located at the
anterior frontal lobe, is found to be largely related to judgments, planning,
relational reasoning and integration of information. This part of the brain is also
suggested to be essential for abstract and complex reasoning. (Damasio, 1994;
Waltz, et al., 1999; Bunge, Wendelken, Badre, & Wagner, 2005; Fuster, 2008)
In a series of fMRI studies, it is found that, similar to making logical judgments,
there are various brain regions activated when making moral judgments. (Moll,
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Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, & Grafman, 2002; Moll, Oliveira-Souza, & Eslinger, 2003;
Greene & Haidt, 2002) Some of the activated regions when making moral
judgments overlap with the areas activated when making logical judgments, for
example the frontopolar cortex, which serves the function of making more abstract
reasoning or judgments. But some of the activated regions are vastly different from
making logical and linguistic judgments, which are mainly linked with making
emotional responses, such as the orbitofrontal cortex, which is associated with
automatic social-emotional responses, and the amygdala, which is located at the
temporal lobe, is believed to be part of the limbic system and to control human’s
emotional responses. (Moll, Oliveira-Souza, & Eslinger, 2003; Gerrig & Zimbardo,
2010) The activation of diverse brain regions between making moral judgments and
logical or linguistic judgments seem to suggest we are also using diverse mental
processes in generating these different types of intuitive feelings.

Interestingly, even if we focus within the realm of moral judgments, it is still
possible for the judgments to be generated by diverse mental processes. There is a
popular view according to which our moral judgments are made by dual processes,
namely affective and cognitive mechanisms. In the theory of social intuitionism, for
example, affect plays an important role in making moral judgments. Social
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intuitionists believe that we often make moral judgments first and then search for
reasons. Haidt vividly describes this process as the emotional dog chasing its
rational tail. Affect, in their theory, comes before and influences our moral
judgments, but this does not mean that reasoning is meaningless in making moral
judgments. In the theory, reasoning takes part in justification of the judgments and
communication with other people. It is possible for the reasoning process, although
it comes after the judgments, to have influence on other people’s affect and
judgments. (Haidt, 2001) Thus it seems to suggest both affective and cognitive
mechanisms take part in making moral judgments.
fMRI studies could provide evidence supporting the view that there are dual
processes in making moral judgments. In the studies from Greene and his
associates (2001), they find that the subjects activate different brain regions when
answering personal and impersonal moral dilemmas. In making judgments on
personal moral dilemmas, which are dilemmas involving taking direct actions on a
person, such as pushing a fat man off a footbridge, the subjects are found to have
increased activity in the brain regions related to affect. Conversely, in making
judgments on impersonal moral dilemmas, which are dilemmas involving only
indirect actions on a person, such as flipping a switch or pressing a button, the
subjects are found to have activation in the brain regions different from answering
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personal moral dilemmas. (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001;
Singer, 2005; Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010)
In addition, as it is believed that the affective mechanism is intuitive and
automatic, which requires less reflection time and produces emotional responses,
while the cognitive mechanism makes slower reasoning, which is easier to lead to
utilitarian judgments, Greene et al. (2008) have another study to investigate
whether moral judgments are really jointly determined by these two mechanisms.
They impose cognitive load on the subjects when the subjects are judging different
moral dilemmas. The cognitive load is expected to force the subjects to have
deeper thinking into the moral dilemmas and to use the cognitive mechanism in
moral judgments, which means it is expected to lead to increased tendency to
make utilitarian responses under cognitive load. As expected, the subjects under
cognitive load were more likely to produce utilitarian responses, compared with the
subjects who were not imposed with cognitive load.
The studies from Koenigs et al. (2007) also provide evidence for dual processes
in moral judgments. Patients who have lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex could be expected to be deficient in using affective mechanisms in making
moral judgments. Koenigs et al. found that these patients are not totally unable to
make moral judgments, but more likely to make utilitarian judgments. It seems to
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suggest that moral judgments are in fact determined by both mechanisms.
In the studies from Nichols and Knobe (Nichols, 2002; Nichols & Knobe, 2007),
the high disgust-sensitivity subjects make harsher judgments to the disgusting
transgressions than low disgust-sensitivity subjects. It is plausible to interpret the
results as differences in preference for affective and cognitive mechanisms. It
seems natural to think that the affective mechanism is more dominant in making
judgments for people who have high disgust-sensitivity, while the cognitive
mechanism is more dominant for people who have low disgust-sensitivity. The
results are compatible with such a thought.
There are more empirical findings suggesting that it is possible for us to make
moral judgments by using distinct brain regions. (For review see (Sinnott-Armstrong
& Wheatley, 2012; Nado, 2012)) This section only presents a few of these studies
and mainly focuses on the realm of moral judgments, but evidence should be
strong enough in supporting the heterogeneity feature in other judgments of the
subjects. Thus heterogeneity seems to be a well-supported feature or possibility of
intuitive feelings.

100

Part II
Chapter 3: Theories of Intuition
In the previous chapter, the thesis has introduced and argued for a list of
features of intuition. In this chapter, the thesis aims to show how we can apply
those features in selecting good theories of intuition. The thesis will scrutinize
several diverse theories of intuition. Although the titles of the following sections
are each named after a particular philosopher, they should also represent
philosophers who hold similar views on intuitions.
In the following sections, the thesis will first introduce the main ideas of the
theories, and then evaluate whether they are good theories of intuition by using
the list of features in chapter 2. The strategies for evaluating theories of intuition
will run like this: for each feature, the theories of intuition have to choose between
(1) accepting and giving a good explanation for the feature, since a good theory of
intuition should not merely be compatible with the feature but also explain it well;
and (2) rejecting and replying to the studies suggesting such feature.
Disagreement with a feature will not necessarily mean the theory is not a good
theory. The thesis will evaluate whether the theory replies to the studies naturally
and well. But if the theory can only respond to the feature by relying on the
argument of irrelevance (IA), which is the argument suggesting that it is impossible
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for empirical research to directly study philosophical intuition, it seems very
possible that the theory has a different target from our discussion. Since the thesis
views ‘intuition’ as robust, striking, rapid feelings generated by apprehending
propositions or thought experiments, without any conscious inference processes, it
seems possible to study intuition by empirical studies. Therefore, a theory that has
to rely on IA in explaining the results of empirical studies seems to be not a full and
good theory of the type of intuition that we are interested in.
There are two things worth noting here. First, it seems that most of the
philosophical theories examined in this chapter are only interested by giving
analyses of the notion of intuition. The theories do not have an explanatory goal for
the features listed in chapter 2, thus it is common to find that the theories are silent
on some features when merely reading the original passages. The thesis will find
whether the theory could potentially offer a direct explanation for the feature if no
direct responses are found in the original passages. If it is unclear how the theory
could explain the features, the thesis will then evaluate whether the theory is
consistent with the features. Consistency with the features is a good start for a full
theory, but we must also be reminded that there are still some details that the
theory needs to fill in.
It must be emphasized that the thesis does not argue that the theories are
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false if they cannot offer explanation for the features. The theories may be true. But
as mentioned in 1.2.2, the thesis is interested in seeking good and valuable theories.
The theories would not be the one we are seeking if they are not successful in
explaining the features and making accurate predictions for intuition.
Second, for space reasons, the thesis will have less discussion of the features
that do not pose threats to the theories and the theories do not have particular
responses to it. For example, the feature of novelty is not a well-discussed feature
in most theories. Thus it is hard to find relevant explanation from the theory
directly. However, most of the theories can easily offer a natural and uninteresting
explanation for this feature, like the new cases are involved in the concepts we
already have. Therefore the thesis will skip the discussion of novelty in most
theories. The feature will mainly be discussed in the section of Lewis’s theory. (3.3)
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3.1 George Bealer
George Bealer believes philosophy has autonomy and authority outside the
realm of science: the subject matter of philosophy cannot be taken over by the
sciences, and the answers given by philosophy to philosophical questions at least
weigh the same as the answers given by sciences. Bealer argues for the autonomy
and authority of philosophy (1998) and the existence of a priori evidence (1999),
and also argues against empiricism. (1992) Bealer’s arguments are built mainly on
his theory of intuition. He believes that intuition is characteristic philosophical
evidence, only intuition can be used in answering the central questions of
philosophy, and intuition should have distinctive evidential value besides of the
empirical experimental evidence.
Intuition is an important component of Bealer’s theory. The first interesting
thing which has to be examined is: which kind of experience is he targeting as
intuition? Bealer seems to have discussion of two concepts of intuition, one which
understands intuition in a loose sense and another which understands intuition in a
stricter sense. On the one hand, he ostensibly characterizes his target as intellectual
seeming. He emphasizes intuition is not a kind of mysterious immediate striking
experience. For the term intuition:
“We do not mean a magical power or inner voice or special glow or any
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other mysterious quality. When you have an intuition that A, it seems to
you that A.” (Bealer, 1998, p. 207)
The term ‘seems’ used here clearly means intellectual seeming for Bealer. That
someone has an intuition that A means that one has intellectual seeming that A
without any sensory or introspective knowledge about the truth of A. (Bealer, 1996,
p. 268) Bealer has a description of how we feel when we have an intuition about de
Morgan’s laws: “when you first consider one of de Morgan’s laws, often it neither
seems true nor seems false; after a moment’s reflection, however, something
happens: it now just seems true.” (Bealer, 1998, p. 207) This example reveals that
Bealer on the one hand believes intuition could be elicited under normal conditions,
which means intuition should not be any far-out experience. This characterization
of intuition seems to suggest that Bealer has a similar target to the target the thesis
discussed in the introductory part (1.2.1), namely the immediate experience
generated by apprehending propositions or thought experiments without any
conscious inference processes under normal conditions.
Although Bealer emphasizes intuition is a non-mysterious source of evidence,
he in fact also holds another understanding of intuition. For Bealer, as intuition is an
intellectual seeming without any help from sensory or introspective knowledge,
Bealer calls his targeted intuition ‘a priori intuition’ or ‘rational intuition’, which has
105

to be distinguished from ‘physical intuition’12, beliefs, common sense, judgments
and others. (1992; 1996; 1998) The main differences between rational intuition and
the others are: (1) rational intuition mainly concerns “whether a case is possible
(logically or metaphysically), and about whether a concept applies to such cases”
(Bealer, 1998, p. 207); and (2) rational intuition presents itself as necessary, while
the others do not. However Bealer honestly adds:
“I am unsure how exactly to analyze what is meant by saying that a
rational intuition presents itself as necessary. Perhaps something like this:
necessarily, if x intuits that P, it seems to x that P and also that necessarily
P. But I wish to take no stand on this.” (1998, p. 207)
Although Bealer is unsure how to accurately express what means by ‘present
itself as necessary’, it seems apparent that to have judgments or common sense
that P would not be a kind of intellectual seeming to us that ‘necessarily P’.
Therefore, Bealer’s rational intuition clearly has to be distinguished from physical
intuition, beliefs, judgments and the like.
Then, why does Bealer’s rational intuition present itself as necessary, or why it
can be treated as basic evidence? Bealer gives the answer that rational intuition has

12

Physical intuition is a kind of seeming concerning “what would happen in a hypothetical situation
in which physical, or natural, laws are held highly idealized”, like “when a house is undermined, it
will fall.” (1998, p. 207) This type of intuition has to rely on our sensory or introspective experience
and has nothing to do with necessities (e.g. an undermined house must fall).
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a reliable modal tie to the truth. (1996; 1998; 1999) Why does rational intuition
have a reliable modal tie to the truth? Bealer gives the answer that it is true by
definition. In order to have rational intuition, one is required to possess a concept
determinately, which means one has to understand a concept in the full sense.
Bealer further explains what he means by ‘understand a concept in the full sense’:
“ A subject possesses a concept in the full sense iff (i) the subject at least
nominally possesses the concept and (ii) the subject does not do this with
misunderstanding or incomplete understanding or just by virtue of
satisfying our attribution practices or in any other weak such way.” (1998,
p. 222)
As rational intuition requires the subjects to have full understanding of a
concept and elicit the intuition under high quality cognitive conditions, it is natural
that when one has a rational intuition about a concept, it is impossible for one to
be wrong about that concept. Therefore, rational intuition for Bealer, by definition,
has a reliable modal tie to the truth.
This concept of intuition, in which intuition has a reliable modal tie to the truth,
clearly differs from what Bealer characterizes intuition earlier in a loose sense. It is
clear we should not confuse the two concepts of intuition. The former one is
intellectual seeming derived from complete understanding of a concept and has to
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be elicited under high quality cognitive conditions. The latter one is immediate
feelings toward certain thought experiments or propositions that can be elicited
under normal cognitive conditions.
Most of the time, Bealer seems to talk about intuition in the strict sense. And
as the main aim of his papers is to argue for the autonomy and authority of
philosophy, rational intuition, which is the intuition in the strict sense, is an
important component of the argument as one of the basic sources of evidence in
philosophy. Basic evidence is required to have a tie to the truth, so only the concept
of rational intuition could serve for Bealer’s purpose, intuition in the loose sense
could not replace ‘rational intuition’ in the argument. It is inapposite to interpret
Bealer’s intuition as intuition in the loose sense. Therefore, the thesis will take
rational intuition as what Bealer really means by ‘intuition’.

In this sense of intuition, it is clear that Bealer does not want fallibility to be a
feature of intuition, despite his direct acceptance of the fallibility in several places,
which was also mentioned in the fallibility section (2.1). For example:
“Like sense perceptions, intuitions can (at least occasionally) be mistaken:
for example, our intuition regarding the naïve comprehension axiom is
evidently mistaken.” (Bealer, 1992, p. 104)
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“From the logical and semantical paradoxes we know that intuition can be
mistaken. So the (early modern) infallibilist theory of intuition is incorrect.”
(1998, p. 202)
“I have an intuition – it still seems to me – that the naïve comprehension
axiom of set theory is true; this is so despite the fact that I do not believe
that it is true (because I know of the set-theoretical paradoxes).” (1998, p.
208)
Bealer says he has an intuition on naïve comprehension axiom, but he also
mentions that he believes that the axiom is false. Therefore it shows that Bealer
accepts intuition to be fallible in some cases. However, the term ‘intuition’ used
here seems to be used in the loose sense, Bealer in several other places emphasizes
that intuition is fallible locally or in more holistic way, but it does not show that
intuition in his relevant sense, or rational intuition, could not have strong modal tie
to the truth.
“But, despite their fallibility, intuitions on my view nevertheless have a
certain kind of strong modal tie to the truth. This tie is not ‘local,’ however,
since individual intuitions can be mistaken. Nor is the tie an ordinary
holistic tie: I accept the possibility that some hypothetical subject’s best
efforts at the theoretical systematization of his intuitions might be
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mistaken. Rather, the tie is relativized: specifically, it is relativized to
theoretical systematizations arrived at in relevantly high quality cognitive
conditions. Such conditions might be beyond what individual human
beings can achieve in isolation.” (1998, p. 202)
If the term ‘intuition’ is used in the strict sense, in Bealer’s relevant sense, it
seems intuition is infallible, since for a striking feeling to be rational intuition, the
subject has to generate the feeling through complete understanding of a concept
and under high quality cognitive conditions. ‘Intuition’ in this sense is, by definition,
necessarily correct. Fallible intuition, for example intuition on naïve comprehension
axiom, could be explained as intuition that does not involve possessing a concept
determinately or is not elicited under high quality cognitive conditions. In the strict
sense of intuition, neither intuitions about the naïve comprehension axiom, nor the
judgments of the subjects tested by the psychological studies, is rational intuition.
In his own words:
“[I]f the subject’s intuitions lacked this sort of tie to the truth, that would
only show that the subject did not determinately possess those concepts
(or that the subject’s cognitive conditions were not sufficiently good).”
(1996, p. 269)
Therefore, the falsity of these intuitions or judgments is not evidence
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supporting the claim that rational intuition is also fallible, but merely showing that
they are not rational intuition. Bealer emphasizes that his targeted intuition could
not be tested by empirical studies:
“Although [empirical] studies evidently bear on ‘intuition’ in a less
discriminating use of the term (e.g., as a term for uncritical belief), they
tell us little about intuition in the relevant sense … The thesis that
intuitions have the indicated strong modal tie to the truth is a
philosophical (conceptual) thesis not open to empirical confirmation or
refutation.” (1998, p. 202)
“Many philosophers believe that the empirical findings of cognitive
psychologists such as Wason, Johnson-Laird, Rosch, Nisbett, Kahneman,
and Tversky cast doubt on *intuitions’+ epistemic worth. But, in fact,
although these studies bear on ‘intuition’ in an indiscriminate use of the
term, they evidently tell us little about the notion of intuition we have
been discussing, which is relevant to justificatory practices in logic,
mathematics, philosophy, and linguistics … empirical investigators have
not attempted to study intuitions in the relevant sense.” (Bealer, 1998, p.
213)
In arguing for the strong modal tie between rational intuition and the truth,
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Bealer clearly does not want fallibility to be a feature of rational intuition. His
theory, then, has to respond to the studies supporting the fallibility of intuition. The
general strategy to respond to the studies, however, relies on what we have
discussed in the introductory part, the argument of irrelevance (IA). Bealer tends to
argue that the studies supporting the fallibility of intuition may not reflect what the
features of rational intuition really are. Thus it seems the fallibility of rational
intuition (intuition in the strict sense) is not well-supported by the studies.
Using the radical version of IA that targeted intuition is nearly completely
inaccessible by the empirical studies or by an individual provides easy responses to
the empirical studies. If the studies suggest a certain unwanted feature of rational
intuition, Bealer can simply reply that the subjects in the studies do not possess the
concept determinately or judge under high quality cognitive conditions. However,
as Bealer’s characterization of rational intuition and his reliance on IA, it seems
clear that Bealer discusses different intuitions from us. More importantly, this
radical version of IA poses three other problems to Bealer’s theory.
First, it is mentioned Bealer uses ‘intuition’ in two senses, namely the loose
sense and the strict sense. In his usage of intuition in the loose sense, his targeted
intuition seems to be similar to what is targeted as ‘intuitive feelings’, which is
non-mysterious and could be elicited under normal cognitive conditions. Intuitive
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feelings are not a far-out experience from the ordinary philosophical practice. It
seems very possible for empirical studies to test our intuitive feelings and provide
evidence to support whether intuitive feelings have such and such features.
However, in discussing the reliability of intuitions, Bealer seems to replace the
intuitive feelings by intuition in the strict sense, which he calls rational intuition.
Bealer then argues that the empirical studies are silent on this far-out concept
‘rational intuition’. He seems to want to change the subject of the discussion from
intuition in the loose sense to intuition in the strict sense. He argues that rational
intuition has the features he attributes to it, but the features cannot be tested or
refuted by empirical studies. We should not confuse these two concepts of intuition,
intuitive feelings, which is intuition in the loose sense, and rational intuition, which
is intuition in the strict sense. Bealer has to choose which concept of intuition he is
really interested in.
Two concepts of intuition would not be a big problem for Bealer’s theory. It is
clear that Bealer is more interested in the discussion of rational intuition, but not
intuition in the loose sense. However, this choice leads to a more serious problem.
As Bealer mentions that rational intuition has to be elicited under high quality
cognitive conditions, and “*s+uch *high quality cognitive+ conditions might be
beyond what individual human beings can achieve in isolation” (Bealer, 1998, p.
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202), it seems dubious that we have experienced rational intuition at all. It is
possible that at this time in history humans still have not had an experience that
can satisfy Bealer’s criterion for rational intuition. Could we have some ways to
classify which immediate feelings are rational intuitions? If there are no such
methods for classification, it seems plausible that ‘rational intuition’ is merely a
conceived concept. The theory of a conceived concept named ‘rational intuition’
could not be a good candidate of theory of intuition that we are interested in.
Bealer does give us some criteria for classifying rational intuition, which are
the feelings generated under high quality cognitive conditions and by possessing a
concept determinately. The criterion involved the proposition intuited has to be
true, or called as success conditions. The success conditions, however, make the
theory fall into a Cummins-like dilemma.13 Based on Bealer’s definition, if a feeling
is rational intuition, it must not be false; if the feeling is false, it must not be rational
intuition. But, then, how can we classify which feelings are rational intuition in
practice? Bealer has to choose: either we have methods to classify rational intuition
beyond success conditions, or there are no other ways to identify rational intuition.

13

Cummins (1998) points out a difference between the instruments in science and intuition in
philosophy. In science, the instruments have to be tested through calibration. However, in
philosophy, there is no calibration for our intuition. The advocates of appealing to intuition have to
choose either (i) we have an independent method knowing whether the content of intuition is true;
or (ii) we do not have a method to calibrate intuition. If we have an independent method to know
whether the content of intuition is true, intuition becomes useless in justifying the propositions. If
we do not have a method to calibrate intuition, we should not use it as evidence in philosophy.
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Bealer could argue that there are no other ways to classify rational intuition.
To classify rational intuition, then, we have to know whether the content of a
feeling is true beforehand. However, if we already know whether the content of a
feeling is true or not, we do not need rational intuition in justification anymore. The
main aim of Bealer is to argue for the autonomy and authority of philosophy. He
definitely needs both the modal tie between rational intuition and the truth, and
the justificatory role of rational intuition. Bealer should not choose this option.
Another option Bealer can choose is to claim that we have some other
independent ways in classifying rational intuition. Bealer has not, in fact, offered
any such independent method of classifying rational intuition. He may give some
phenomenology that intuition is robust, striking intellectual seeming that presents
itself necessary for classification, but these features are only able to classify
intuition in the loose sense for us, but not rational intuition. Bealer’s theory has the
responsibility to offer an independent method for the classification of intuition, but
it seems hard for Bealer to find one.

As Bealer has rational intuition but not intuition in the loose sense in mind, it
is natural for him to not believe in the plasticity and the variability of rational
intuition. Since rational intuition is generated under high quality cognitive
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conditions and by possessing a concept determinately, such rational intuition
cannot generate different responses to the exact same vignette. Otherwise one of
the responses seems not to be generated under high quality cognitive conditions or
by possessing a concept determinately. In the similar vein, if two groups of subjects
really generate the feelings under high quality cognitive conditions and by
possessing a concept determinately, it seems impossible for two groups of the
subjects to have different rational intuition on the exactly same case. It is possible
for at least one group of the subjects to be unable to have rational intuition, or the
two groups of subjects are in fact dealing with different cases.
In responding to the empirical studies supporting the plasticity and the
variability of intuition, Bealer may use the general strategy of adopting the radical
version of IA mentioned above. The main problems of adopting IA have been
discussed in the introductory part and several paragraphs before. The thesis will not
repeat them here. Besides this general strategy, it is worth noting that Bealer
actually has direct responses to the studies suggesting variability.
In responding the studies suggesting variability, Bealer seems to adopt what
Sosa calls verbal disagreement to some extent in responding to some of the studies
suggesting variability. This strategy suggests that the difference in the judgments
from two groups of subjects may due to a different understanding of the same
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vignette. Two groups of subjects have verbal disagreement on the concepts
contained in the vignette. The subjects may in fact deal with different cases.
Therefore it is natural for them to have different or even conflicting judgments and
the conflicting responses do not necessarily show that it is possible for rational
intuition to be in conflict.
Take the example of the Galileo paradox of infinity. The paradox asks us to
judge which of the following series of numbers: (i) 1,3,5,7,9 … ; or (ii) 1,2,3,4,5 …
has fewer members in it. It seems natural to think series (i), the odd numbers, has
fewer members than series (ii), the natural numbers, but we know the answer is
both series of numbers have the same number of members. Bealer argues that he
has both intuitions on this case: (i) has fewer members than (ii); and (i) and (ii) have
the same number of members, but he does not think either that his intuitions are
conflicted or that one of the intuitions is false. Bealer rather argues that there are in
fact two senses of fewer-than. In one sense, we know that the members of natural
numbers include both odd numbers and even numbers, so it seems to us that
natural numbers should have more members than odd numbers. Bealer calls it the
fewer-than in proper-subset sense. In another sense, we also know that for any
members in (ii) we can find a one-to-one corresponding member in (i). In this
no-one-one-correspondence sense, (i) and (ii) have the same number of members.
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(1992) Therefore, even if we have ostensibly different/conflict feelings on the same
question, it does not necessarily suggest that it is possible for intuition to have
variation. The different judgments may merely due to different understandings of a
concept.

Bealer does not have extensive discussion on particularity and heterogeneity.
It has to be reminded that there are two senses of particularity. Intuition (Pa1)
seems to be more easily elicited by particular cases; and (Pa2) seems easier to have
particular contents. Bealer defines the target of rational intuition as “whether a
case is possible (logically or metaphysically), and about whether a concept applies
to such cases.” (Bealer, 1998, p. 207) He also emphasizes the reliability of particular
intuition, saying: “the on-balance agreement among our elementary concrete-case
intuitions is one of the most impressive general facts about human cognition”
(1998, p. 214) It seems reasonable to think that Bealer believes in Pa1 as a feature
of rational intuition, but it is unclear whether Bealer agrees that Pa2 is also a
feature of rational intuition, since Bealer has several examples of intuition with
general contents, like the intuition on the naïve comprehension axiom. Although
Bealer’s theory may be compatible with particularity, the theory is silent on the
reason for the feature.
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Heterogeneity is also a feature that seems less discussed by Bealer. Bealer
seems to assume that intuition is a single, cohesive natural mental state, as he
defines intuition as “a sui generis, irreducible, natural (i.e., non-Cambridge-like)
propositional attitude that occurs episodically.” (Bealer, 1998, p. 213) Although this
definition may be open to other interpretations that are compatible with
heterogeneity, namely that it is still possible for the propositional attitude to be
elicited through diverse mental processes, in the papers discussing intuition (1992;
1998; 1999), Bealer shows a consistent tendency in arguing for the reliability of
rational intuition as a whole. It seems reasonable to interpret Bealer’s theory as
assuming a single conception of intuition. Though it seems possible for Bealer’s
theory to be compatible with the feature of heterogeneity through modification, it
is still unclear how his theory could explain the reason for heterogeneity.

It is also worth noting several other similar views of intuition in this section.
Kirk Ludwig, similar to George Bealer, believes intuition is elicited from the
conceptual competence, or in Bealer’s term ‘possessing a concept determinately’.
Ludwig says that he uses “’intuition’ to mean an occurrent judgment formed solely
on the basis of competence in the concepts involved in response to a question
about a scenario, or simply an occurrent judgment formed solely on the basis of
119

competence in the concepts involved in it (in response, we might say, to the null
scenario).” (Ludwig, 2007, p. 135)
Ludwig’s theory of intuition is different from Bealer’s on the topic of necessity.
Intuition, for Ludwig, needs not present itself as necessary. (Ludwig, 2007, p. 136
n18) Ludwig seems to hold a more moderate account of intuition than Bealer.
However, as noted in the introductory part, Ludwig’s theory of intuition also largely
relies on the argument of irrelevance (IA). Ludwig emphasizes the concept of ‘ipso
facto intuition’. ‘Ipso facto intuition’ means “ipso facto judgments which express
solely the subject’s competence in the deployment of the concepts involved in
them in response to the scenario” (Ludwig, 2007, p. 144), which is similar to
Bealer’s rational intuition that has to be elicited by possessing a concept
determinately. Ludwig’s theory seems also to import success conditions in
classifying ipso facto intuition and using the same strategies as Bealer in responding
the list of features in chapter 2. Thus Ludwig’s theory also seems to face similar
serious problems to Bealer’s.
Laurence BonJour is also an advocate of appealing to intuition. He believes
that intuition is a feeling that a proposition seems to be necessary: the proposition
directly and immediately seems to us to be true in any possible world without any
inference processes. (BonJour, 1998, pp. 106-107) BonJour also believes that
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intuition is a priori and that it provides evidence. Intuition is a priori in the sense
that it does not need to involve other types of evidence, as he says: "an act of
rational insight or rational intuition … depends upon nothing beyond an
understanding of the propositional content itself.” (BonJour, 1998, p. 102)
Unlike Bealer, BonJour holds a more moderate account of intuition. He
believes intuition is fallible and defeasible though the contents of intuition ‘seem’
to us necessarily true. BonJour argues that even if proposition P is false, one is a
priori justified to believe in P as long as one intuited that P. “*I+t is enough that *a
priori] justification be capable of warranting belief where experience is silent.”
(BonJour, 1998, p. 121) The thesis will not go too deep into BonJour’s theory, but it
seems his theory is more compatible with the list of features than Bealer’s.

To sum up, Bealer’s theory largely relies on the radical version of IA in
responding to the studies suggesting unfavorable features of intuition. This
approach leads his theory to face serious problems. Although his theory may be
compatible with particularity and heterogeneity, it seems his theory can hardly
provide a reason for these two features. Bealer’s theory also appears to target a
far-out concept of intuition. Thus his theory is probably not a good theory of
intuition that we are interested in.
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3.2 Ernest Sosa
Ernest Sosa is an also advocate of the method of appealing to intuition, but
Sosa certainly has different understanding of the term ‘intuition’ than George
Bealer. Sosa views intuition as, briefly, an inclination to judge/assent to certain
propositions by merely understanding the proposition.14
Sosa starts introducing his theory of intuition by objecting to the naïve
definition for intuition as ‘apprehension without reasoning’. This definition is clearly
not enough for philosophical discussion, since it does not exclude some perceptions
and introspections without conscious process of reasoning. Sosa then has further
modification to this definition. In Sosa’s earlier view, he seems to think that
philosophical intuition mainly deals with abstract propositions. Thus he defines
intuition in the following way:
“At t, it is intuitive to S that p iff (a) if at t S were merely to understand
fully enough the proposition that p (absent relevant perception,
introspection, and reasoning), then S would believe that p; (b) at t, S does
understand the proposition that p; and (c) the proposition that p is
abstract.” (1998, p. 259)

14

Bealer (1998, pp. 233-234) interprets Sosa’s view (1996) as “a general reduction of seemings” to
inclination to believe. But this comment cannot accurately reflect Sosa’s view. Sosa in his later
papers (1998; 2007a; 2007b) explicitly intends to distinguish between intuition and other sorts of
experience. Sosa seems not to be interested in the general reduction of all kinds of seemings.
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Intuition is an inclination to believe a proposition elicited by sheer
understanding of that proposition. This view does not have too many changes in his
more recent papers. In one of his later papers, he says: “On my proposal, to intuit
that p is to be attracted to assent simply through entertaining that representational
content.” (2007b, p. 101)
However, there seem to be two main differences in Sosa’s later view. First, in
Sosa’s earlier paper, he seems to think that genuine intuition targets abstract
propositions. (1998) In Sosa’s later view, the idea that the target of intuition has to
be abstract seems to be less emphasized. (2007a; 2007b) Sosa is more specific on
the target of intuition and starts to argue that intuition in his relevant sense is an
inclination to believe modal propositions. He says:
“[T]he content [of rational intuition] is explicitly or implicitly modal (i.e.
attributes necessity or possibility) … there is no very deep reason. It’s just
that this seems the proper domain for philosophical uses of intuition.”
(2007b, p. 101)
Another main difference is that Sosa seems to emphasize a competence
component of intuition in his later theory. In the earlier version of Sosa’s theory,
Sosa often has discussion of what he calls ostensible intuition, and makes the
analogy between intuition and ostensible perception. (1996; 1998) We ostensibly
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perceive a bent stick in water. Although the stick is straight and we know it is
straight, it still ostensibly seems to us that the stick is bent in water. Similarly we
ostensibly intuit that, using Bealer’s example, the naïve comprehension axiom is
true. Even if the axiom is false and we know it is false, it still ostensibly seems to us
and has attraction for us to believe that it is true. It seems that in the earlier version
of Sosa’s theory, Sosa uses the term ‘intuition’ to mean intuition in the loose sense
(i.e. ‘ostensible intuition’ (1996)) and focuses on discussing this type of intuition.
In later papers, Sosa puts more efforts in emphasizing the notion of
competence. He narrows down his discussion to rational intuition, and makes clear
the differences between rational intuition, propositional intuition (which is intuition
with propositional content) (2007a) and empirical intuition (which concerns only
the physical world, for example the principles of folk physics). (2007b) Sosa argues
that rational intuition is more special in the sense that he imports competence
conditions into this concept. For example:
“S intuits that p if and only if S’s attraction to assent to <p> is explained
rationally by two things in combination: (a) that S understands it well
enough [competence], (b) that <p> is true.” (2007a, p. 52)
“The intuition is rational if and only if it derives from a competence, and
the content is explicitly or implicitly modal (i.e. attributes necessity or
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possibility” (2007b, p. 101)
It seems that, similar to Bealer, Sosa also focuses on different senses (i.e. strict
sense and loose sense) of intuition in his earlier and later papers. To be fair, in
evaluation of Sosa’s theory, the thesis will take both concepts of intuition into
consideration. But it seems Sosa tends to understand and argue for the evidential
value of intuition in the sense of rational intuition rather than ostensible intuition.

Sosa apparently accepts fallibility as a feature of intuition, both for ostensible
intuition and rational intuition. In his earlier discussion, Sosa seems to use the
terms ‘intuition’ and ‘rational intuition’ to mean ostensible intuition, which is
intuition in loose sense. He gives an example of the grip of paradox where intuition
is fallible. it is possible for us to have the same strength of ‘rational intuition’ on
both “(a) if from a place with a sand dune one removes a grain with no other effect
on the sand, then a sand dune will remain in that place; and … (b) a place entirely
devoid of sand contains no sand dune.” (1998, p. 258) He adds “[e]ach of these
seems indeed a proper object of rational intuition. Each is an abstract proposition
believed just in virtue of being understood; no perception, introspection, or
reasoning is required. [emphasis added]” (1998, p. 258) Sosa probably agrees that
surely one of these ‘rational intuitions’ has to be false. However, it is important to
125

note that the term ‘rational intuition’ used here seems to mean intuition in loose
sense (i.e. ostensible intuition), as Sosa uses this term just after he has made an
analogy between intuition and ostensible perception and Sosa later does not
specify his usage of the term ‘rational intuition’. It seems that in his earlier theory,
even if Sosa uses the term ‘rational intuition’, he is in fact meaning ostensible
intuition. Therefore, although in one place he has direct acceptance of the feature
of ‘rational intuition’:
“Actually, we have long known of the fallibility of apparent rational
intuition, even in the best conditions of alertness, normality, and
reflection time” (1998, p. 261);
and mentions the notion of competence once after the acceptance, it seems
more apposite to interpret the ‘rational intuition’ Sosa used here by ostensible
intuition, since it seems to be what Sosa really means in his earlier theory. In Sosa’s
earlier discussion, he focuses on arguing intuition’s evidential value but not its
infallibility. He makes the analogy between perception and intuition. As perception
is also fallible and acceptable to be one of our evidence sources, it seems we have
to treat intuition the same as perception.
Sosa focuses on ostensible intuition in earlier discussion, this point would be
clearer if compared with the definition of rational intuition he offers in the later
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papers. (2007a; 2007b) Sosa describes intuition in the loose sense as having several
features, including the feature of fallibility. He says “*propositional intuition’s+
content can be false; there can be false intuitions.” (2007a, p. 52) However, as also
noted above, in Sosa’s definition of rational intuition, he seems to import both
competence and success conditions. (2007a, p. 52; 2007b, p. 101) This definition of
rational intuition seems to us that Sosa intends to argue for the high reliability of
rational intuition. This is a natural move for Sosa’s theory. As Sosa argues for the
evidential value of rational intuition, it seems rational intuition had better be highly
reliable. Therefore, it is natural for Sosa to import both competence and success
conditions into the notion of rational intuition.
But does this move mean that Sosa believes rational intuition is infallible?
Clearly not. Sosa directly accepts the fallibility of rational intuition, he says:
“Justified introspective and rational intuitions can be false, as can
perceptual intellectual seemings and even justified perceptual beliefs.”
(2007a, p. 57)
However, as Sosa defines in later papers (2007a, p. 52), if rational intuition is
derived from competence and the content of it has to be true, how can rational
intuition be compatible with the feature of fallibility? In explaining the feature, Sosa
makes an interesting analogy between fallible rational intuition and
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misremembering. Suppose we have a definition for retentive memory of <p> that:
“At t, the subject believes <p> and at t’, later than t, the subject believes
<p> because she believed <p> at t.” (2007a, p. 57)
Then, does it counts as misremembering something, when at t’ you believe
your friend lives on 31st floor because at t you believe your friend is lives on 33rd
floor? In one sense, following the definition, it does not count as misremembering,
since it is not even a case of memory! But in our common sense, we allow there is
fallible memory. Therefore this case seems to be a case of misremembering.
Rational intuition is fallible in a sense similar to misremembering for Sosa. In
one sense, following the definition of rational intuition (2007a, p. 52), it seems
impossible for the content of rational intuition to be false. Thus if there is false
intuition, it is necessarily not rational intuition. Bealer (1996) and Ludwig (2007)
argue for the high reliability of intuition in this way. Conversely, Sosa (2007a),
following common sense, intends to allow the fallibility of rational intuition. He
argues that rational intuition is fallible in the sense similar to the case of
misremembering. Even if rational intuition is derived from competence and the
content of rational intuition <p> is true, but it is fallible because it is possible for us
to think we rationally intuit that <p’>, which is very similar to <p>, and <p’> is false.
In order to be compatible with our common sense, Sosa intends to include this kind
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of fallible rational intuition into his notion of rational intuition. Thus he modifies his
definition of rational intuition in the following way:
“S rationally intuits that p if and only if S’s attraction to assent to <p> is
explained by a competence (an epistemic ability or virtue) on the part of S
to discriminate the true from the false reliably (enough) in some subfield
of modally strong propositional contents that S understands well enough,
with no reliance on introspection, perception, memory, testimony, or
inference (no further reliance, anyhow, than any required for so much as
understanding the given propositional content).” (2007a, p. 58)
This modification of the definition seems to be tantamount to waiving the
success conditions in Sosa’s theory. His theory only requires rational intuition to be
reliable enough in distinguishing false intuition from good intuition. It seems fairly
clear that Sosa’s theory accepts and is compatible with the fallibility of rational
intuition. He may also agree that some of the empirical studies reveal the fallibility
of rational intuition.
A worry is, as Sosa’s theory requires rational intuition to be elicited from a
competence, how can we classify rational intuition or a competence besides
knowing whether the content of the intuition is true? Similar to Bealer, Sosa has to
choose between either there is another method of classifying rational intuition/a
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competence, or there are no other methods beyond knowing that the content of
intuition is true. If there are no other methods, we have to know whether its
content is true before we know whether a feeling is elicited from rational
intuition/a competence. If we already know whether the content of a feeling is true,
we do not need rational intuition/a competence in justifying the content of a
feeling anymore.
Sosa’s theory, nevertheless, could afford to make another choice. Unlike Bealer,
Sosa does not hold the success conditions strictly. He modifies his definition for
rational intuition to rule out the infallibility of rational intuition. Although he also
faces the problem of classifying the feelings derived from competence, he can
accept to find a method to classify which feelings are derived from competence
beyond the truth of their contents. It seems the dilemma would not be a serious
threat for Sosa’s theory. The only worry is whether Sosa could give us a method of
classifying rational intuition beyond knowing the truth of the content in practice.

Regarding plasticity, Sosa seems to accept this feature for intuition. In replying
to the studies of ordering effects in epistemic intuition from Swain, Alexander and
Weinberg, Sosa accepts that the studies may reveal a certain feature for intuition,
but disagrees with the conclusion Swain et al. draw from their studies that Swain et
130

al. “contend that this instability undermines the supposed evidential status of these
intuitions.” (Swain, Alexander, & Weinberg, 2008, p. 138) Sosa again makes the
analogy between perception and intuition. He says:
“[T]he effect of priming, framing, and other such contextual factors will
affect the epistemic status of intuition in general, only in the sort of way
that they affect the epistemic status of perceptual observation in
general … The upshot is that we have to be careful in how we use
intuition, not that intuition is useless.” (Sosa, 2007b, p. 105)
It seems clear that Sosa would accept the feature of plasticity for intuition. It is
also not hard for his theory to explain the plasticity of intuition, as he defines
intuition as an inclination to believe certain proposition based on merely
understanding of the proposition, and this kind of inclination is hardly believed to
be impossible to change. What he disagrees with is the idea that the plasticity of
intuition implies that intuition is useless. An interesting question would be: is
rational intuition also allowed to have the feature of plasticity? Would the plasticity
of a feeling mean the feeling is not derived from a competence? It seems Sosa does
not have a direct reply to these questions. A guess is that Sosa would also allow
rational intuition to have the feature of plasticity according to our common sense,
similar to what he has done in the part of fallibility.
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In responding the studies suggesting the variability of intuition, Sosa often
worries whether the studies could really reveal the sort of intuition we are
interested in. Recall that the variability of intuition we are interested in is two
groups of subjects having different intuitions to the exact same vignette or
proposition. Sosa worries that it is possible that many studies on variation are
eliciting the feelings of two groups of subjects on different vignettes or propositions.
In responding particularly to the studies from Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001),
Sosa (2005) argues that the cultural difference in Gettier cases or zoo cases may
due to the unspecified details in the vignettes, two-forced choice response and
verbal disagreement.
As not all details are specified in the vignette, Sosa thinks that it is possible for
different groups of subjects to fill in different details in the vignette and different
groups of subjects are then responding to different cases. For example, different
groups of subjects may import different background assumptions about American
corporations. Some of the subjects may think it is very likely that a protagonist who
long owned an American car will continue to buy an American car again, while
some of the subjects may not. If the subjects are really responding to the same
vignette with different interpretations, it seems the studies are not in fact testing
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what we are interested in.
Besides of the possibility of importing different details into the vignette, Sosa
argues that the studies have a limitation in forcing the subjects to choose between
whether the protagonist ‘really knows’ or ‘only believes’. The subjects may want to
choose the third choice like “we are not told enough in the description of the
example to be able to tell whether the subject knows or only believes” (2005, p. 13)
This worry about the third-person approach of studying intuition has been
discussed in the introductory part and would not be discussed at length here.
However, there are other studies which do not force the subjects to choose
between two choices but also reveal group differences in the responses. How will
Sosa respond to those studies?
Sosa has a general worry about the studies that the results may only reveal
verbal disagreement between the subjects but not the differences of intuition. For
example, the term ‘knowledge’ may in fact pick out different concepts in different
cultures. Sosa also proposes this possibility in responding to other studies. (2007b)
For example in the studies from Nichols and Knobe (2007), they are asking the
subjects to judge whether the protagonist is responsible for his/her acts if he/she is
in the determinist universe. The results find that the subjects in the high
disgust-sensitivity group are more willing to judge that the protagonist is
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responsible for his/her acts than those in the low disgust-sensitivity group. Sosa
points out that there are two senses of ‘moral responsibility’: one is the
attributability sense, another is the accountability sense. It is possible for different
groups of subjects to hold moral responsibility in different senses and thus to give
different responses to the same vignette. Therefore the results may not reflect
what the intuition of the subjects really is.
Although Sosa in many places worries whether the studies could really reflect
the variability of intuition, he does not explicitly say that he believes intuition
cannot possibly vary from group to group. In fact, Sosa seems to believe that there
can be a variation of intuition in strength. He says “*t+here may be more or less
variation in the strength of the intuition, but either everyone who intuits either way
intuits that p or else everyone who intuits either way intuits that not-p.” (2005, p.
107) However, in general, Sosa seems to have negative attitude to the variability of
intuition. We can see a reason why he hesitates to accept the variability of intuition:
if two groups of subjects really have conflicted intuition, it seems to reflect that at
least one group of subjects is giving false judgments. Sosa does not want to define
rational intuition in the radical sense that Bealer does or to say that one group of
subjects does not have competence to derive rational intuition. Therefore it seems
natural for Sosa to explain the variation of responses by verbal disagreement.
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However, Sosa’s theory in fact can be compatible with the feature of variability.
Sosa can argue by pushing his analogy of perception further. It would be generally
agreed that we have perceptual competence, even though our perception can go
wrong in for example the Müller-Lyer illusion. (Figure 3) And regarding the
Müller-Lyer illusion, there can also be differences between subjects in different
cultural groups. It is found that the San foragers of the Kalahari are less likely to be
affected by the Müller-Lyer illusion. Participants from Evanston, by contrast, are
significantly more easily affected by the illusion. (Segall, Campbell, & Herskovits,
1966; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010)
Although it is possible for perception to have
differences in different cultural groups, and

though some of the responses are true and

Figure 3 The Müller-Lyer illusion. Many
people have a tendency to percept the

some of them are false, it does not prevent us

segment above is longer than the segment
below.

from thinking that different groups of subjects
still have competence in perception and use perception as evidence. Likewise, even
if there are conflicting intuitions in a certain case, it does not prevent us from
treating intuition as evidence in other cases.

The main problem with Sosa’s theory comes from particularity. Sosa seems not
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to notice both types of particularity, especially in his earlier theory. In Sosa’s earlier
theory of intuition, the target of intuition is ‘abstract propositions’. As most of his
examples for intuition show, for example “that 2+2=4; that no sphere is a cube; that
nothing is numerically self-diverse” (1998, p. 260), the ‘abstract proposition’ in his
sense seems to mainly focus on ‘general propositions’. He may not believe it is
easier for intuition to be elicited (Pa1) by particular cases or (Pa2) with particular
contents, as he also says: “Intuition gives us direct insight into the general and
abstract.” (1998, p. 265)
Of course we may sometimes have striking immediate feelings on some
abstract propositions, but it seems more frequent for us to have intuition on
particular cases. Take an example from Nichols and Knobe again:
“In *deterministic universe+, a man named Bill has become attracted to
his secretary, and he decides that the only way to be with her is to kill his
wife and 3 children. He knows that it is impossible to escape from his
house in the event of a fire. Before he leaves on a business trip, he sets
up a device in his basement that burns down the house and kills his family.
Is Bill fully morally responsible for killing his wife and children?” (Nichols
& Knobe, 2007, p. 670)
It seems very possible for us to have certain immediate striking feelings in
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responding to this case, probably on Bill is fully morally responsible for his acts. It
seems common for us to refer this kind of experience as intuition. Sosa would think
it is also a kind of intuition, as he believes the studies from Weinberg, Nichols and
Stich targets to intuition to certain extent. But how does Sosa’s theory explain the
occurrence of this kind of intuition? In Sosa’s earlier theory, it seems such striking
feeling could not be treated as intuition, since “Bill is fully morally responsible for
his acts” seems neither an abstract nor general proposition.
In Sosa’s later theory, although it does not require intuition to be abstract and
general, it also seems to have difficulties in explaining the occurrence of this kind of
intuition. Suppose we have attraction to assent to the proposition that “Bill is fully
morally responsible for his acts”. Can we have such inclination due to sheer
understanding of the proposition that “Bill is fully morally responsible for his acts”?
It seems could not be happened if we have not encountered the details of the
vignette. This proposition is also not a modally strong proposition, that “Necessarily,
Bill is fully morally responsible for his acts”. Sosa’s theory seems to ignore this kind
of intuition, which seems commonly treated as intuition. The theory is hardly
compatible with and unable to explain the particularity of intuition.
On heterogeneity, although Sosa explicitly notices this kind of objection to his
theory:
137

“From an everyday point of view all the things you have in mind share a
certain feature. We are inclined to believe them spontaneously. But on
my view this does not indicate a common source of all these inclinations
(as there is in the case of all the perceptual sub-sources). The processes
leading to these inclinations are not sufficiently similar to each other to
constitute a homogeneous natural (or objective) kind. The real sources
are as different as memory, subliminal perception, wishful thinking,
prejudice and rational intuition.” (Sosa, 2007a, pp. 66-67)
In Sosa’s reply to this objection, he does not have direct responses to the
feature of heterogeneity. It is also unclear how Sosa’s theory can explain or be
compatible with the feature. More work has to be put into explaining this feature of
intuition.

To conclude, Sosa’s theory of intuition is compatible with and able to have
explanation for fallibility, plasticity and variability, but the theory is incompatible
with or missing some important details for particularity and heterogeneity. If the
theory can do more work in modifying the account according to and explaining the
features of particularity and heterogeneity, it would seem to be a quite good
candidate for a theory of intuition.
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3.3 David Lewis
David Lewis has a more direct and simpler approach to understanding intuition.
He clearly says that “’intuitions’ are simply opinions … some are commonsensical,
some are sophisticated; some are particular, some are general, some are firmly held,
some less. But they are all opinions.” (1983, p. x)
Intuitions are simply opinions/beliefs. More specifically, it seems plausible to
interpret Lewis’s view as the view that intuitions are the retrieval of pre-existing
opinions/beliefs. In another discussion from Lewis, he says:
“One comes to philosophy already endowed with a stock of opinions. It is
not the business of philosophy either to undermine or to justify these
pre-existing opinions, to any great extent, but only to try to discover ways
of expanding them into an orderly system.” (1973, p. 88)
In Hilary Kornblith’s interpretation of this passage, Kornblith thinks
‘pre-existing opinions’ here means intuitions for Lewis. Kornblith says “Russell and
Lewis are in agreement about proper philosophical method: we start with our
intuitions, and then we try to systematize them at best we can. [emphasis added]”
(Kornblith, 2006, p. 11) Although there may be other interpretations for Lewis’s
theory, for convenience this section will only consider the interpretation that
‘intuition’ means retrieving pre-existing opinions.
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In more recent discussion, Peter Van Inwagen (2001) also makes a similar claim.
He says:
“Our ‘intuitions’ are simply our beliefs – or perhaps, in some cases, the
tendencies that make certain beliefs attractive to us, that ‘move’ us in the
direction of accepting certain propositions without taking us all the way
to acceptance. (Philosophers call their philosophical beliefs intuitions
because ‘intuition’ sounds more authoritative than ‘belief.’) Our beliefs
have all sorts of sources and can very easily be wrong.” (Van Inwagen,
2001, p. 149)

Lewis and Van Inwagen seem to think that it is an easy and uncontroversial
approach in understanding intuition. Both of them do not have excessive use of the
term ‘intuition’ or explicit discussion on it at length. But we can easily see this
theory has advantages in explaining several features for intuition.
To reduce intuition to merely the retrieval of past belief or opinion can have an
easy explanation for fallibility, plasticity and variability. It seems uncontroversial
that the content of our beliefs or opinions could be false. It seems also
uncontroversial that our beliefs and opinions could be easily influenced by our
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emotions or the quality of cognitive conditions. It is also natural for different groups
of subjects to have different patterns of beliefs or opinions. The theory of
assimilating intuition with merely the retrieval of past belief or opinion seems to
have direct and easy explanations for these three features of intuition.

However, it is less clear how the theory is able to explain other features of
intuition. First, regarding heterogeneity, if intuition really is merely the retrieval of
past belief, the theory seems unable to explain why different intuitions may be
generated from diverse mental processes. Using fMRI studies done by Greene and
his associates (2001) as an example, the subjects activate different brain regions in
judging (i) personal and (ii) impersonal moral dilemma. Suppose we have two past
beliefs/opinions that (i) ‘we should not push the fat guy off the footbridge to save
five people’ and (ii) ‘we should flip the switch in order to save five people though
kill one’. It is less clear that how Lewis’s theory could explain why the subjects are
activating different brain regions in retrieving past beliefs (i) and (ii).

Second, concerning particularity, Lewis’s theory seems unable to offer a good
explanation for the feature, especially on the second type of particularity, which
means it is easier to have intuitions with particular content. To illustrate, suppose
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we have two past beliefs/opinions. One with general content that ‘knowledge is not
merely justified true belief’, and one with particular content that a protagonist in a
certain Gettier case does not have knowledge. It seems that it is easier to have
latter intuition than the former, general one. Lewis’s theory seems unable to
provide a good reason why it is easier to retrieve our past beliefs/opinions with
particular content but not past beliefs/opinions with general content.

Most importantly, as Bealer (1998, p. 209) also notes, viewing intuition as
merely retrieval of past beliefs/opinions seems to be incompatible with the feature
of novelty. It seems uncontroversial that subjects could have immediate striking
feelings to newly constructed cases that the subjects have not encountered before.
For example, the subjects who have not encountered Gettier cases before may have
immediate striking feelings on a certain Gettier case. It seems not plausible that the
subjects already have past beliefs/opinions on that Gettier case and are retrieving
those beliefs/opinions during judging. Lewis owes us an explanation of how his
theory is compatible with the feature of novelty, or of why we should not view such
non-past beliefs/opinions as intuition.

This direct and simple theory for intuition, to view intuition as merely
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pre-existing opinions/beliefs, seems unable to provide a good explanation for the
features of intuition. Of course Lewis and Van Inwagen’s theory of intuition can be
interpreted as “the tendency that make certain beliefs attractive to us” (Van
Inwagen, 2001, p. 149) or the feeling derived from background knowledge or
beliefs (3.4). These interpretations of their views seem to be similar to the theories
discussed in other sections. Therefore, the thesis only chooses to discuss the
interpretation of retrieval of past beliefs/opinions, and leaves the related discussion
of other interpretations to other sections.
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3.4 Hilary Kornblith
One of the possible interpretations of Lewis’s theory is to view intuition as
feelings derived from background beliefs. This interpretation of Lewis’s theory
seems to be very similar to the theory held by Hilary Kornblith. In Kornblith’s view
of intuition, intuition is, briefly, the judgments derived from background theories or
concepts.
Before we get into the details of Kornblith’s theory, it seems worth noting
which kind of experience Kornblith refers to as intuition. In Knowledge and its Place
in Nature, Kornblith starts to introduce his theory of intuition by the example of
appealing to intuition in philosophy. Kornblith believes that it is uncontroversial that
we appeal to intuition in Gettier cases, Searle’s case of American soldier and the
like in philosophy. (2002, pp. 4-5) He says “I will take intuition to be pinned down by
the paradigmatic examples of it given above …” (2002, p. 8) At first glance, it seems
Kornblith refers intuition to the similar target with this thesis.
This kind of intuition, Kornblith believes, is derived from our background
knowledge/theories. (1998; 2002) He makes an analogy between a rock collector
and a philosopher. A rock collector makes judgments by “find[ing] [if] a rock
meeting certain conditions, it would (or would not) count as a sample of a given
kind.” (2002, p. 12) The rock collector makes more accurate judgments when
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he/she has better understanding of the features of rocks. But how about rock
collector’s judgments at an early stage? Kornblith believes the judgments are
derived from background knowledge of the rock collector. He says:
“Background knowledge will play a substantial role in determining a
first-pass categorization of samples.” (2002, p. 13)
After having more practice and a more sophisticated theory of rocks, the rock
collector will get to have more accurate judgments on rocks.
Likewise, Kornblith seems to believe the practice of appealing to intuition in
philosophy works similarly with the rock collector’s analogy. Taking epistemic
intuition as example, epistemologists are making judgments on whether a case
(such as Gettier case) meets certain conditions and whether it counts as a sample
of ‘knowledge’. The cases in epistemology to epistemologists are analogous to the
rocks to rock collector. Certain conditions of ‘knowledge’ seem to come from
epistemologists’ background knowledge/theories. Although the practice of eliciting
intuition from background knowledge/theories seems quite similar to what some
philosophers call conceptual analysis, Kornblith emphasizes this kind of judgments
is in principle nothing more than rock collector’s judgments, they are a posteriori
but not a priori. He says “All such [rock collector’s] judgments, however obvious,
are a posteriori, and we may view the appeal to intuition in philosophical cases in a
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similar manner.” (2002, p. 12)
Kornblith, unlike Alvin Goldman and Frank Jackson, uses intuition to mean not
merely untutored judgments derived from background knowledge, but also to
include those judgments derived from sophisticated theories. In his criticism to
Alvin Goldman’s theory, Kornblith clearly allows intuition to refer to some
theory-contaminated judgments:
“The worry about ‘theory contamination’ which Goldman raises is not, I
think, unreasonable. Rather, what I mean to be suggesting is that the
move to pre-theoretical intuition is, perhaps, the wrong solution to the
problem … It is not influence by background theory which is the
problem … A problem arises only when the background theory which
influences our intuitions is mistaken.” (2007, pp. 33-34)
Kornblith in other passages may be less clear on this point. For convenience,
the thesis will interpret Kornblith means intuition to include the judgments derived
from sophisticated theories. This interpretation will not make a huge difference in
evaluation of Kornblith’s theory.

An important thing worth noting is Kornblith seems to believe that the target
of our intuition is something internal, about our background
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knowledge/beliefs/concepts, since he thinks that intuition is the judgments derived
from background knowledge. This internal investigation can be linked to external
phenomenon if we have accurate background knowledge/beliefs. Kornblith again
explains by using his analogy to rock collector:
“Although I am asked a question about rocks, I answer it by enquiring into
what I believe. This is a perfectly reasonable thing to do if I have good
reason to think that my current beliefs are accurate, or if I do not have
access a better source of information. By looking inward, I answer a
question about an external phenomenon. This, to my mind, is what we do
when we consult our intuitions.” (2002, pp. 14-15)
Someone may disagree with this interpretation for Kornblith’s view on
intuition, since Kornblith in another place says the view that intuition is used in
understanding our concepts is misleading:
“Now it is at this point that many philosophers will be tempted to bring in
talk of concepts and conceptual analysis: in appealing to our intuitions, it
will be said, we come to understand the boundaries of our shared
concepts. But I don’t think this way of seeing things is illuminating. By
bringing in talk of concepts at this point in an epistemological
investigation, we only succeed in changing the subject: instead of talking
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about knowledge, we end up talking about our concept of knowledge.”
(2002, pp. 9-10)
Reading this passage as a whole, it seems that Kornblith does not mean
viewing the target of intuition as something internal is misleading. As Kornblith
believes knowledge (and also morality) is a natural kind, he believes it is misleading
to change the subject of epistemology from knowledge itself to our concept of
knowledge. Thus this passage does not conflict with the view that intuition targets
our beliefs/concepts. This point seems to be made clearer in Kornblith’s later paper:
“Appeals to intuition are designed to allow us to illuminate the contours
of our concepts. By examining our intuitions about imaginary or
hypothetical cases, we should be able to come to an understanding of our
concepts of, for example, knowledge and justification.” (2006, pp. 11-12)
In Jennifer Nagel’s interpretation of Kornblith, she also reads Kornblith in a
similar way:
“Hilary Kornblith allows that Bealer, Goldman, and Pust may be right to
claim that a person’s epistemic intuitions are a valuable source of
evidence about her concept of knowledge; however, Kornblith draws a
sharp distinction between the project of finding out about our concepts
of knowledge and the project of finding out about knowledge itself.”
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(Nagel, 2007, p. 804)
As Kornblith believes knowledge is a natural kind and we are able to
investigate it directly through other practices, he thinks that we should directly
study knowledge itself in epistemology, but not the concepts of knowledge and
justification. Thus he says:
“[O]ur concepts of knowledge and justification are of no epistemological
interest. The proper objects of epistemological theorizing are knowledge
and justification themselves, rather than our concepts of them … If we
wish to have a genuine understanding of knowledge itself, we need to
look at the phenomenon, not our concept of it.” (2006, p. 12)
Therefore, for Kornblith, it seems intuition does not play any important role of
studying knowledge in epistemology, since we have other more direct method in
studying knowledge itself. Kornblith believes intuition can still play a role in the
place that about more obscure things, for example “what magnetosomes represent”
(1998, p. 137), but not for epistemology and morality. This section is only interested
in Kornblith’s account of intuition, only concerning the target of intuition in
Kornblith’s sense, it seems reasonable to interpret Kornblith as viewing intuition
targeting our internal beliefs/concepts.15

15

Bealer makes the inaccurate interpretation that Kornblith holds the account that “intuitions are
identified with a ‘raising-to-consciousness’ of nonconscious background beliefs”. (Bealer, 1998, pp.
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Viewing intuition as judgments derived from background knowledge/beliefs
has advantages in explaining fallibility, plasticity and variability. On fallibility, it is
obvious that intuitions of the naïve may go wrong, since our background beliefs are
probably false at an early stage. Therefore Kornblith emphasizes that “judgment
guided by accurate background theory is far superior to the intuitions of the naïve.”
(2002, p. 14) How about, then, the intuition derived from accurate background
theory? It seems Kornblith would believe this kind of intuition is also fallible.
Although the background theory could become more accurate theory through
continuous modification, it is less likely for the theory to become perfect. It is still
possible for intuition derived from the accurate but not perfect theory to go wrong.
Kornblith’s theory is compatible with the feature of fallibility and seems to offer a
good explanation for it.

Regarding plasticity, Kornblith allows intuition to have changes with the
progress of background knowledge/theory. For example, we have naïve intuition
derived from a background belief that <p>, but when we have a more accurate
theory that leads us to think not-<p>, our intuition may then change from <p> to

209, 234) It seems more likely to be the interpretation of David Lewis’s account but not for
Kornblith.
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not-<p>. Thus Kornblith says after his description of the judgments from the rock
collector:
“So too, I want to say, with appeals to intuition in philosophy. These
judgments are corrigible and theory-mediated.” (2002, p. 13)
Despite Kornblith’s acceptance of plasticity, this possibility of changes in
intuition seems not to be similar to another type of plasticity we have in mind. For
example, our judgments to the exactly same vignette may have changes due to
merely the cleanness of environment. (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008) It
seems there are not any systematic differences of background theory between
different groups of subjects, but the studies find that the subjects in dirty room
make more severe moral judgments than the subjects in a normal room or a clean
room. The results seem to suggest that the cleanness of the environment or the
feelings of disgust may have influence on the subjects’ intuitive feelings. This type
of plasticity, however, seems not to happen because of the changes in background
theory of the subjects. Would Kornblith allow this type of plasticity and how he can
explain this feature of intuition?
Kornblith does not explicitly reply to plasticity of intuition in this sense, but it
seems his theory of intuition can allow this type of plasticity. One possibility is to
say humans’ judgments can be influenced by various factors like affect. It is natural
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for intuition, which is also one kind of judgments, to be affected by disgust feelings.
Kornblith’s theory probably can be compatible with the plasticity, but it seems
better to have more explanation of the feature.

In explaining variability, Kornblith’s theory can also offer us an easy
explanation. Kornblith points out that there is sometimes for our intuitions to have
general agreement with each other. He believes this phenomenon can be explained
by common knowledge or beliefs held by us.
“The extent of agreement among subjects on intuitive judgments is to be
explained by common knowledge, or at least common belief, and the
ways in which such background belief will inevitably influence intuitive
judgment, although unavailable to introspection, are none the less quite
real.” (2002, p. 13)
This explanation for general agreement of intuition seems also able to explain
the variability of intuition between different groups of subjects. It seems very
possible that different groups of subjects have different common background
knowledge or beliefs. Thus one group of subjects may have a response pattern
consistently different from another group of subjects. Kornblith’s theory can allow
the variability of intuition and can offer an easy explanation for the feature.
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The main problem with Kornblith’s theory comes from its lack of explanations
for particularity and heterogeneity. Kornblith probably has some degree of
particularity of intuition in mind, on the first type of particularity that (Pa1)
intuition is easier to be elicited by particular cases. As most of examples of
appealing to intuition in philosophy he gives are intuitions on particular cases, he
says: “This method of appeal to intuitions about cases has been used in every area
of philosophy, and it has often been used with subtlety and sophistication.” (2002,
p. 5) Kornblith may notice that it is easier for intuition to be elicited by the
particular cases. The problem is, Kornblith’s theory seems not to have an
explanation of why it is easier to have intuition from particular cases.
Moreover, on the second type of particularity, which means (Pa2) it is easier to
have intuition with particular content, it is less clear how Kornblith’s theory can
have explanation of this feature. Recall that Kornblith believes that intuitions are
judgments derived from background knowledge/beliefs. Suppose we have a
background belief that ‘knowledge is justified true belief that is justified
non-accidentally’. Of course we can derive a Gettier intuition that a protagonist
under Gettier situation does not have knowledge from this belief. However, when
we are asked ‘is JTB sufficient for knowledge?’, it is less likely for us to have intuition
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that ‘JTB is not sufficient for knowledge’. If intuition is the judgments derived from
background knowledge/beliefs, it seems unclear why it is easier to have intuitions
with particular content (Gettier cases) but not with general content (JTB conditions).
Kornblith’s theory owes us an explanation of this type of particularity.
On heterogeneity, Kornblith’s theory may be compatible with the feature, but
the problem is, like most other philosophical theories, the theory does not offer an
explanation for this feature.

It is worth mentioning the theory from Michael Devitt before closing this
section. Devitt is an advocate of appealing to intuition, though he also views
intuition as a posteriori. He says:
“The naturalist does not deny ‘armchair’ intuitions a role in philosophy
but denies that their role has to be seen as a priori: the intuitions reflect
an empirically based expertise at identification” (Devitt, 1994, p. 564 n27;
2005)
Devitt distinguishes two kinds of intuition, the most basic intuition and the
richer intuition. The most basic intuition is the intuition in identifying whether a
concept applies to an instance. For example, suppose we have a concept of F and
we are interested in knowing the nature of a kind F, the most basic intuition helps
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us to identify what counts as Fs and non-Fs. After the identification, we may have a
richer intuition about what is common and exclusive for Fs. (Devitt, 2006)
These intuitions, though they may easily go wrong at early stage, become
more reliable through having a better theory or through practice. We may become
expert and reliable in identifying certain kind of Fs, although we are unable to
explain how we use such ability. It may be similar to the case that we become
expert in typing, but we cannot explain how we type fast and accurately. Devitt
gives an example of a paleontologist:
“Consider, for example, a paleontologist in the field searching for fossils.
She sees a bit of white stone sticking through gray rock, and thinks ‘a pig’s
jawbone’. This intuitive judgment is quick and unreflective. She may be
quite sure but unable to explain just how she knows. We trust her
judgment in a way that we would not trust folk judgments because we
know that it is the result of years of study and experience of old bones;
she has become a reliable indicator of the properties of fossils.” (Devitt,
2006, p. 492)
This theory of intuition may have some difficulties in explaining plasticity and
variability. Regarding plasticity, suppose we are identifying ‘moral acts’ through our
concept of ‘morality’, why is it possible for our identification to be influenced by, for
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example, the dirty environment of the room? Though Devitt’s theory may be
compatible with the feature, it seems the theory needs a clear explanation for the
feature.
Besides, it seems Devitt’s theory also needs more explanation of variability.
Suppose two groups of subjects are shown in the result of a test question to have
very similar concepts of, for example, knowledge. Why is it possible for two groups
of subjects to have different response patterns on some vignettes in epistemology?
(Weinberg, Nichols, & Stich, 2001) Devitt’s theory seems also lack an explanation of
this feature, though it may turn out to be compatible.

To conclude, although Kornblith’s theory can be compatible with most of the
features and have good explanation on some of the features, the theory is unclear
on how it can explain the second type of particularity and heterogeneity. There are
still gaps in his theory in explaining those features. Thus the theory is not currently
a good candidate for a complete theory of intuition.

156

3.5 Timothy Williamson
The final theory the thesis introduces in this chapter is the theory from
Timothy Williamson. Williamson’s theory of intuition is also simple. He thinks that
there is nothing distinctive of the state we call intuition. ‘Intuition’ used in
philosophy is in fact nothing more than ‘judgments’. To have intuition is the same as
applying the ordinary capacities for making judgments.
Williamson thinks that philosophers often call their judgments ‘intuition’
simply because they run out of arguments. By saying that the judgments are
‘intuitive’, the judgments would seem to be more authoritative and justified.
However, it does not suggest that intuition has any mysterious power of tracking
the truth. There is nothing special for the ‘philosophical intuition’. There are no
sharp distinctions between philosophical intuition and non-philosophical judgment.
As Williamson says:
“*S+o-called intuitions are simply judgments (or dispositions to judgment);
neither their content nor the cognitive basis on which they are made
need be distinctively philosophical.” (2007, p. 3)
“*Metaphilosophical talk of intuitions+ conceals the continuity between
philosophical thinking and the rest of our thinking. So-called intuitions
involve the very same cognitive capacities that we use elsewhere.” (2004,
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p. 152)
The rapid, robust feelings of intuition to certain propositions, for Williamson,
are nothing more than the conscious inclination to believe that certain proposition.
He also believes that the term ‘intuition’ will unavoidably include the belief or
inclination to believe that is irrelevant to philosophical interests, since we are
unable to distinguish them.
“Does a belief or inclination to believe with an inappropriate causal origin,
such as wishful thinking, count as an intuition? We do not want such
beliefs or inclinations to believe to carry weight in philosophy. But that is
explicable quite independently of whether we classify them as intuitions.
Wishful thinking is as relevant to the epistemology of intuition as
misperception is to the epistemology of perception.” (2007, pp. 217-218)
Williamson offers an example of the Gettier intuition and describes how we
finally have the ‘intuition’ on Gettier cases by applying the ordinary capacities for
making judgments. To judge that the protagonist in a certain Gettier case does not
have knowledge, we in fact make two types of modal judgments:
“First, we must make a judgement of possibility: the case could have
occurred (as described neutrally, without use of ‘know’ or cognate terms).
Second, we must make a counterfactual conditional judgement: if the
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case had occurred, then the subject would have had a justified true belief
that Q without knowing that Q. Together, these two judgements entail
another judgement of possibility: that there could have been someone
who had a justified true belief that Q without knowing that Q. That result
is inconsistent with the principle that, necessarily, one knows that Q if
and only if one has a justified true belief that Q, and thereby forces the
rejection of the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief, because
analyses are understood as implying statements of necessary and
sufficient conditions. Thus one way of objecting to the use of such cases
to establish epistemological conclusions is to raise doubts about the kinds
of modal thinking on which it rests.” (2004, pp. 110-111)
It seems reasonable to interpret Williamson as viewing intuition as our
ordinary judgments. For Williamson, there seem to be no huge differences between
‘I intuit that p’ and ‘I judge that p’.

This view of intuition can offer good explanation for many features of intuition.
First, it is clear that this theory of intuition is compatible with the feature of
fallibility. It is uncontroversial that it is possible for our judgments to be false.
Williamson also explicitly accepts this feature for judgments that most philosophers
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call ‘intuition’:
“Our fallibility about our evidence is unavoidable; we have no alternative
but to muddle through at best we can.” (2004, p. 152)
“Metaphilosophical talk of intuitions … feeds the methodological illusion
of an incontestable starting-point, if not of intuited facts, then of facts as
to what we intuit. There is no such starting-point; evidence can always be
contested” (2004, p. 152)
In Williamson’s explanation for the fallibility of intuition, he seems to apply the
evolutionary approach. We need to have quick judgments for survival but the
judgments do not lead us to have true theories. He says:
“Such unreflective discriminations have survival harsh environments,
where quick decisions are needed … Although the physical theory
embedded in our intuitions has to be approximately correct in its
predictions over a limited range of practically important cases, we do not
expect it to match or even resemble the true physics in its representation
of the underlying reality. Why should we expect intuition to do much
better elsewhere?” (2004, p. 114)
This explanation for the fallibility of judgments reminds us of a series of
studies of heuristics from Tversky and Kahneman. The description of heuristics and
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the explanation of the fallibility of heuristics are similar to the explanation that
Williamson offers. It seems also a possible interpretation for Williamson’s theory
viewing that intuition is merely heuristics, which are the judgments made by
cognitive shortcuts. The thesis will leave the discussion of this possible
interpretation for Williamson’s theory to later in this section.

Regarding plasticity and variability, Williamson’s theory can also offer an easy
explanation for them. As Williamson views intuition as ordinary judgments, beliefs
or inclination to believe, it is not surprising that the judgments/beliefs/inclination
to believe can possibly change. Likewise, variability can be easily explained. For
example, since intuition is the judgments made by applying our ordinary capacities,
the judgments may be easily influenced by the preference of cognitive style from
different cultural groups. (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002) It is
unsurprising that the judgments/beliefs vary from group to group.

On heterogeneity, Williamson’s theory seems to have a natural and good
explanation for it. In Williamson’s view of intuition, it is possible for the term
‘intuition’ to refer to a group of judgments. For example, the ‘Gettier intuition’ in
his example is in fact refers to two types of modal judgments. It is possible for other
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types of ‘intuition’ to refer to different groups of judgments. It is unsurprising that
different types of intuition may be generated from diverse mental processes. Even
for ostensibly the same type of intuitions (e.g. moral intuition), they can in fact
involve different types of judgments. Thus it is also possible for them to be
generated from diverse mental processes.

Unfortunately, Williamson’s theory lacks an explanation for particularity,
especially on the second type of particularity that (Pa2) it is easier to have intuition
with particular content than general content. In applying ordinary capacities of
making judgments, it seems we do not have a tendency to make more judgments
with particular content or with general content. We can easily have judgments on,
for example, ‘smoking is bad for John’ and ‘smoking is bad for the health’. However,
consider the Gettier cases again, we often have two judgments from the cases: (i) a
certain protagonist in Gettier case does not have knowledge; and (ii) JTB is not
sufficient for knowledge. The philosophers often refer only the judgment (i) to
intuition but not the judgment (ii). It seems easier to have judgment (i) through the
case but not the judgment (ii). Why does this happen if intuition is also applying
ordinary capacities for judgments? Although Williamson’s theory is compatible with
the feature, the theory seems not to have a direct explanation for the feature.
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Moreover, Williamson seems to overemphasize that intuition is nothing more
than judgments. There is a worry that reducing intuition to judgments may ignore
the features that are exclusive for intuition. Taking the judgments (i) and (ii)
mentioned above as example, it seems clear that we are more likely to make the
judgment (i) with rapid, robust feelings, while the judgment (ii) would not be made
with such feelings. It is worth reminding that there are still some differences
between judgments and intuitions, for example, “*j+udgments are a kind of
occurrent belief; as such, they are not seemings.” (Bealer, 1998, p. 210) There seem
still some phenomenological differences between ‘I have intuition that p’ and ‘I
judge that p’. Williamson may be right that having an intuition is merely an
application of our ordinary capacities of making judgments, but it seems misleading
to say that intuition is simply judgments. We should not ignore intuition is rapidly
and robustly generated. Some exclusive features of intuition have to be noted in his
theory.

To sum up, Williamson’s account of intuition seems to be compatible with
most of the features and able to have natural explanations for them. Unfortunately,
those explanations are not offered in detail and the theory seems unable to give us
a direct explanation for the feature of particularity. Moreover, Williamson’s theory
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seems to oversimplify intuition and ignore the exclusive features for intuition. It
may make his account less attractive as a good theory of intuition. Nevertheless,
since it seems possible to interpret Williamson’s theory as viewing intuition as
heuristics, Williamson may modify his account according to psychological account
of intuition. (4.1) The psychological theory of intuition seems to have a more
accurate characterization of intuition and can help Williamson’s theory to fill in the
details for explanations of the features. The discussion of the psychological account
will be the main focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4: Psychological Theory of Intuition
4.1 Dual Processes of Reasoning
Philosophical theories of intuition may not be false, but it seems there are
gaps that need to be filled in. It is also unclear how the theories can help us in
making prediction of intuition. In order to find the ways to fill in the gaps of the
theories, it may be good to look at the discussion on intuition from another aspect,
for example from the aspect of psychology.
Psychologists in fact sometimes have discussion of intuition. In the
psychological conception of intuition, the term ‘intuition’ seems to be used in the
sense similar to Williamson (i.e. one type of ordinary judgments). Some
psychologists construct theories of this type of judgments or of the system that
generates this type of judgments. These theories are what the thesis calls the
psychological theory of intuition.
Saying that psychological theory can fill in the gaps of explaining the features
of intuition, there may initially be several worries about this suggestion. First, how
can we translate psychological terminology into philosophical terminology? It
seems inappropriate to translate philosophical usage of the term ‘intuition’ into the
psychological usage of ‘intuition’, since we notice that psychologists sometimes use
the term in much looser sense than we use it in philosophy to mean, for example, a
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guess.
Additionally, it seems that psychologists have ostensibly disorganized
discussion on intuition-related topics. Psychologists often use various different
terminologies in the discussion, for example, associative system and rule-based
system; experiential system and rational system; heuristic processing and analytic
processing. In the discussion, psychologists rarely use the term ‘intuition’, or use
the term in a very loose sense. It seems hard to find a suitable theory in psychology
that can account for philosophical intuition at first glance.
Nevertheless, psychologists in fact have a systematic discussion on an
intuition-related topic. The main focus of their discussion actually surrounds two
types of mental processes, namely the system 1 and system 2. Roughly, system 1 is
often labeled to have the general features of being “associative, holistic, automatic,
relatively undemanding of cognitive capacity and rapid”, while system 2 is labeled
as “rule-based, analytic, controlled, relatively demanding of cognitive capacity and
slow.” (Stanovich & West, 2000, p. 659) Sometimes the judgments made by system
1 would also be attributed the features of being more affect-related and robust
than the judgments made by system 2. (Epstein, 1994, p. 711)
Various terminologies are actually introduced by the psychologists in their
dual-process theories of reasoning. The terminologies can be organized into these
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two types of mental processes. For example, associative system, experiential
system and heuristic processing can be organized into the group of system 1,
rule-based system, rational system and analytic processing can be organized into
the group of system 2. (Stanovich & West, 2000, p. 659) Although there may be
slightly different meanings between different terminologies grouped into system 1
(or 2), most of them share the general features for system 1 (or 2). Different
dual-process theories may have disagreements on some trivial issues, but the core
of the dual-process theories is suggesting that our judgments are made by two
diverse types of mental process.

There is a large body of empirical evidence supporting the dual-process
theories. (For review, see (Epstein, 1994)) In the studies, psychologists find clues
suggesting that there are really dual processes of reasoning. The judgments with
the features of system 1 are often made faster than the judgments with the
features of system 2. Sometimes the judgments of system 2 override the judgments
of system 1. Sometimes the two systems jointly determine the decisions. But the
results clearly suggest that there are dual processes of reasoning.
For example, there are the jelly-bean experiments which ask the subjects to
draw a jelly bean from a bowl. The subjects who can draw a red jelly bean will be
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awarded money. There are two bowls for the subjects to draw from: a small bowl
which contains one red jelly bean out of ten and a large bowl which contains ten
red jelly beans out of a hundred. This means that both bowls have the same
probability of winning. However, the results find that most of the subjects have a
preference to draw from the large bowl. Although some subjects noticed that both
bowls have the same probability of winning, some of them report that it seems to
them more likely to draw a red jelly bean from the large bowl, since there are more
red jelly beans in it. (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992)
The subjects also show the preference for greater number of red jelly beans in
the unequal probabilities version of the jelly-bean experiments. In this version of
the experiment, most subjects prefer to draw from a large bowl that contains less
than ten red jelly beans out of a hundred (<10% of winning), rather than choosing
from a small bowl, which contains one red jelly bean out of ten (10% of winning).
Some of the subjects even prefer to draw from the large bowl when there are only
five red jelly beans out of a hundred in it (5% of winning). Many subjects who made
the non-optimal choice report that they have conflicted feelings. Although they
know the small bowl has an objectively greater probability to win, they still feel
they have better chance to win by drawing from the large bowl. Some of the
subjects who made the optimal choice also report that they in fact override their
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preference to draw from large bowl. (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994)
The reports of the subjects on conflicting feelings between subjective feelings
on winning chance and objective probabilities seem to suggest there are really two
parallel systems operating in determining the judgments. One system concerns the
subjective feelings on the chance to win. The system is automatic and more
affective. It seems to have features more similar to system 1. Another system
concerns the objective probabilities. The system is more rational and it seems to
have features more similar to system 2. Some of the subjects report that they
override the subjective feelings on winning chance. The reports also seem to
suggest that the former system generates judgments prior to the latter system. The
latter system concerning the objective probabilities seems to be relatively slower
than the former system. But we still need more evidence in thinking the judgments
from two systems are really generated in this sequential order.
There are the studies asking the subjects to report their first three thoughts of
vignettes about unfortunate accidental events. The studies find that the first
thought of the subjects often seems to have the supposed features of the
judgments derived from system 1, while the third thought seems to be more similar
to the judgments made by system 2. For example, when the subjects imagine
themselves as a protagonist in an accident, their first thought is more affective and
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to blame the others. But the third thought would become more rational and accept
some of the responsibility to the accident. (Epstein, 1993)
The results of these studies support the dual-process theories at least in the
way that there seem really to be two diverse mental processes in making
judgments. A number of psychologists may believe the studies also provide
evidence revealing some features of two processes of reasoning: one is more rapid,
automatic and affective, which is similar to the judgments made by system 1;
another one is slower, controlled and seem to be affect-free, which is similar to the
judgments made by system 2. Both systems can make judgments separately, but
they sometimes jointly operate in making decisions.

It seems apparent that there is a systematic discussion among the
psychologists on dual-process theories of reasoning. But how is it related to
philosophical discussion on intuition? It seems there are still some difficulties in
translating ‘philosophical intuition’ into psychological terminologies. Nevertheless,
if the psychological theory fits the features of philosophical intuition, then it seems
a good reason for thinking that the psychological theory could serve as an account
of philosophical intuition, even if it appears on the surface that philosophers and
psychologists are talking about different things. As the thesis mentioned in the
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introductory part (1.2.1), the thesis uses the term ‘intuition’ as the immediate
striking feelings elicited from apprehending of propositions or thought experiments,
without any conscious inference processes. This kind of feelings are often described
as rapid, robust, automatic, relatively undemanding of cognitive capacity and
elicited through unconscious processes. It seems the general features of system 1 in
psychology match most of these basic features of intuition in philosophy. It seems
reasonable to think that the discussion of system 1 in psychology is not totally
unrelated to philosophical discussion of intuition.
As a suggestion, it seems worth to examine the psychological explanation for
the list of features of philosophical intuition. Let us stipulate that the ‘psychological
conception of intuition’ will refer to a feeling derived mostly from system 1. It
seems one of the plausible interpretations of the psychological account of
philosophical intuition. We may see how this account explains the list of features
offered in chapter 2.
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4.2 Explanation for the Features
Similar to the philosophical theory of intuition, psychological theory has to be
evaluated through examining its explanation of the list of features listed in chapter
2.
Regarding fallibility, it is clear that psychological theory is compatible with this
feature of intuition. The fallibility of system 1 is long known and widely noted by a
number of psychologists. Since system 1 is often viewed as a system processing
information more efficiently and effortlessly to make quick judgments but giving
less weight to the accuracy of judgments, the system is described as making
tradeoff between the accuracy and the time taken in thinking. (Kahneman, Slovic, &
Tversky, 1982) There are many studies in psychology showing that the judgments
made by system 1 sometimes go wrong, including the studies mentioned in chapter
2.1, a series of studies on heuristics principles by Kahneman and Tversky, the
studies finding that human’s judgments are subject to hindsight biases (Fischhoff,
1975), fundamental attribution errors (Ross, 1977) and beliefs bias effects.
(Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002, p. 673)
How does the psychological theory give an explanation for this feature of
intuition? An explanation is quite similar to how Williamson explains the feature.
System 1 is used for survival purposes. The system processes the information more
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efficiently by giving up accuracy in order to make quick judgments. This tradeoff
between accuracy and time for thinking helps humans to survive in harsh
environments. Through a long history of evolution, the system gains its value for
human survival. However, the evolution of system 1 only secures its value for
survival, but not its value for leading us to the truth.
Another explanation for fallibility is implied by the psychological theory. Since
system 1 is relatively undemanding of cognitive capacity, it is not surprising that the
system may sometimes make inaccurate judgments. To illustrate, let’s use the
theory of heuristics as an example. The theory proposes that we process
information more efficiently by using a set of unconscious shortcut methods
(heuristics principles), the principles help us to largely reduce the time taken in
thinking and making decisions. However, these principles are not perfect. They may
sometimes lead us to make the wrong judgments. Both reasons seem to be natural
and plausible. The psychological theory seems to provide two good reasons why
intuition has the feature of fallibility.

The psychological theory also seems to be compatible with and can offer good
explanations for both of the two types of particularity. For the first type of
particularity that (Pa1) intuition seems easier to be elicited by the particular cases
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but not abstract, general principles: as some psychologists believe that system 1 is
more concretive and affective, we can find the system more easily responds to
“concrete exemplars and narratives”. (Epstein, 1994, p. 713) Why can the affective
feature of system 1 also explain how the feelings derived from system 1 are more
easily elicited by narratives (particular cases)? It is because narratives more easily
influence our emotion than abstract principles. Narratives are found to be
“emotionally engaging and represent events in a manner similar to how they are
experienced in real life, involving location in place and time, goal directed
characters, and sequential unfolding.” (Epstein, 1994, p. 711) Therefore, it is natural
for us to more easily have the feelings derived from the system 1, which is more
concretive and affective, from narratives (particular cases).
The second type of particularity, that (Pa2) it is easier for intuition to be
elicited with particular content but not general content, can also be explained by
the concretive feature of system 1. As the system 1 is less available for the abstract
representations, it seems harder for the feelings derived from system 1 to have
more abstract content. It seems more likely for the feelings derived from system 1
to be elicited with concrete content, since system 1 “encodes experience in the
form of concrete exemplars and narratives, and operates according to a set of
inferential rules.” (Epstein, 1994, p. 713) Thus it is reasonable to think that the
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feelings are more likely to be elicited with particular content.
There is a group of psychologists (e.g. Bruner) who emphasize the distinction
between two types of mental representation, namely narrative and propositional.
These two types of mental representation can also be grouped into system 1 and 2
roughly. This view has some additional features for narrative thought besides the
general features of system 1. Narrative thought (roughly system 1) is believed to be
more story-like and specific than propositional thought (roughly system 2). (Epstein,
1994, p. 713) If these additional features are also features for system 1, it seems
natural for the feelings derived from system 1 to more easily have particular
content.
The theory of heuristics can also provide an explanation for the feature of
particularity. One of the heuristics is availability, which is a shortcut for making
judgments by the assessing availability of instances. (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky,
1982) It suggests that sometimes we make quick judgments by concerning the
particular instances that are available to us. If the heuristic of availability is not
rarely used in deriving the feelings from system 1, it seems reasonable to assume
the particularity of intuition.

Since system 1 is a holistic and affective system, it can also provide an
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explanation for plasticity. One kind of plasticity of intuition is on similarity and
familiarity. There are studies finding that the similarity and familiarity of a
proposition may attract us to regard it as true. More specifically, the subjects have a
tendency to judge a proposition true if they encountered that proposition before or
if that proposition is similar to a true proposition. (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992) As
system 1 is more holistic, it seems the system 1 would be more likely to be
influenced by similarity and familiarity in making judgments than system 2. The fact
that we can become more familiar with a proposition <p> over time might explain
how we can intuit not-<p> at one time and <p> at a later time. The studies seem to
have natural results in confirming the feature of system 1.
In addition, regarding another type of plasticity that intuition may have
changes with the disgust or fear feelings, as system 1 is a more affective system, it is
not hard for it to explain why emotion can influence our immediate judgments
derived from system 1. The framing effect of judgments, the hypnosis studies
conducted by Wheatley and Haidt and the other studies can have a good
explanation by the affective feature of system 1.
Moreover, Horowitz (1998) notes that the framing effect can also be explained
by prospect theory. Since gains and losses have different ‘decision weight’
subjectively, it is natural for the subjects to have different feelings towards the
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frame concerning gains (lives saved) and the frame concerning losses (lives lost). As
the judgments derived from system 1 are affective, it is no surprise that the
judgments/feelings derived from system 1 could be affected by the subjective
feelings concerning different frames.

The dual-process theory may also provide a natural explanation for variability.
It is suggested that how the subjects feel, and how compelling the feelings are, are
dependent on the degree of dominance of system 1. Different groups may have
different degrees of preference for system 1. The differences in preference may
lead to different feelings derived by system 1 on the exact same case. For example,
in the studies from Norenzayan et al. (2002), they suggest that there is a tendency
for East Asian subjects prefer the intuitive cognitive style, which is similar to system
1, while Western subjects prefer the formal cognitive style, which is similar to
system 2.

Although the judgments generated from system 1 seem to be unified, it is not
impossible for system 1 to make judgments by using diverse mental processes. First,
in the theory of dual processes of reasoning, it is possible for system 1 and 2 to
have interaction and to make judgments jointly. Both systems may link to different
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brain regions. In making a judgment, which brain regions are activated depends on
what systems we are using. Choosing which system has more privilege in judgments
also depends on whether the problem contains affective elements, or requires the
subjects to think deeply. Therefore it seems natural for the subjects to use different
brain regions in making different types of judgments. Even if they are making the
same type of judgments, like moral judgments, it is possible for two vignettes to
contain different degrees of affective elements, thus the subjects may respond to
them by using system 1 to different degrees.
Besides, there are some views suggesting that system 1 is not a unified mental
process. For example, Jonathan Evans notes that both Thomas Wilson and Keith
Stanovich think that “System 2 appears to be a more coherent and consistent
concept in the generic dual-system theory than does System 1 because multiple
systems of implicit cognitive processes exist.” (Evans, 2008, p. 263) It seems to
suggest that system 1 could more or less be separate cognitive capacities. If the
views that system 1 is also a heterogeneous kind are correct, it seems system 1
matches and could provide reason for the heterogeneous feature of intuition.

The psychological theory of intuition does not merely accidentally match the
basic features that philosophical intuition has. It can also be compatible with the list
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of features offered in chapter 2 and provide natural and detailed explanations for
them. It seems to suggest that the psychological theory can be evaluated as one of
the good candidates for the theory of intuition.
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4.3 Conclusion
In the introductory part, the thesis mentioned that it aims to provide a
method for selecting a good theory of intuition, and further to try to find such a
theory. We specified our targeted intuition as immediate striking feelings elicited
from apprehending propositions and thought experiments. The features of the
feelings are listed and argued for in chapter 2. The features are the criteria for
selecting a good theory of intuition. Unfortunately, in the evaluation of
philosophical theories in chapter 3, we find that although many of the theories are
compatible with the features and possibly true, they cannot provide detailed
explanations for the features. Some of them even cannot be compatible with the
features. There are gaps in the theories have to be filled in. Thus it seems hard for
us to treat the theories as good theories of intuition.
We can see a possible theory of philosophical intuition in another subject,
which is the dual-process theory introduced in chapter 4. The psychological theory,
unlike the philosophical theory of intuition, is not merely compatible with the list of
features provided in chapter 2. The theory also provides natural, detailed and good
explanations for philosophical intuition. Although it is arguable whether we can
simply translate ‘philosophical intuition’ to ‘the feelings derived mostly from system
1’ in psychology, the psychological account matches and is able to explain most of
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the features listed in this thesis, which seems to be a good reason to believe the
psychological theory could serve as an account of philosophical intuition, even if it
appears on the surface that philosophers and psychologists are talking about
different things. Therefore, the psychological theory seems to be a candidate for
good theories of philosophical intuition. As this theory is compatible with several
philosophical theories introduced in chapter 3, it may help to fill in the gaps of
philosophical theories.

What if the psychological theory is really a generally accepted theory of
intuition? What could this conclusion contribute to the current debates on intuition?
We may think of its contribution in two ways. First, as mentioned in the
introductory part, a good and valuable theory of intuition has to make accurate
predictions on intuition. It may be unclear that what predictions the philosophical
theories could make about intuition, but some predictions can be easily drawn from
psychological theory. One plausible prediction is as follows: as intuition is more
robust when conditions produce affect, if the words chosen in a vignette are more
emotional, it is expected that more people will report their intuitions are stronger
in responding to the vignette, as opposed to people who are responding to another
vignette which contains only neutral words. The robustness of their judgments
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should be stronger and reflection time should be faster than others. The theory
could also make some other predictions about intuition, but additional details are
beyond the scope of this thesis.
Second, the theory offers answers to some of the main disputes on intuition,
for example, on its reliability, its evidential status and whether philosophy ought to
use intuition as methodology in the future. The theory explains how intuition is
fallible. It mentions intuitive feelings will lead us to make wrong judgments under
some conditions, for example when the subjects are required to make the
judgments while their emotions are affected, under limited responding time or
cognitive load. It is clear that we should use reliable intuition but not unreliable
intuition (e.g. intuition generated when emotion is seriously affected) as evidence.
However, in doing philosophy, what we really interested in is the truth but not what
we feel. When we make judgments on thought experiments, we are not required to
make the judgments under limited responding time or cognitive load. If it turns out
that the judgments of system 2 are generally more reliable than the judgments of
system 1, it seems good to question why we need the judgments of system 1 to be
evidence for a theory. One possible suggestion from this theory is, philosophy could
ignore intuition in the future and we should weigh more on the experts’ opinions
who have deep thoughts, which are presumably from system 2, on certain subject
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matters.16
There are probably some philosophers disagree with these conclusions
suggested by the theory. Then the philosophers have to show us some evidence
that discourages us from believing the theory, such as evidence that indicates that
the theory makes some inaccurate predictions on intuition. Alternatively, they
might build up another good theory of intuition. It may still be controversial which
theory we should believe if there are many theories that could offer good
explanations for the features, but at least we argue for the theory of intuition on
the same ground.

The most important thing is, the thesis is suggesting a method of evaluating
the theories of philosophical intuition. Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis are examples
of evaluating theories through their explanation of the features. Following this
method we probably could find the theories that can explain most of the features
of intuition, and thus can satisfy the desiderata for a good theory of intuition. It is
suggested that we have to restrict our discussion of intuition according to a good

16

Some of the judgments philosophers tend to call ‘intuition’ may actually end up being system 2
judgments. Therefore what they have discussed may not really be intuitions after all. In that case,
we could continue to use such judgments in studying philosophy, but it is suggested to stop calling
such judgments ‘intuitions’ in the future.
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theory of intuition, and it is believed that our discussion of intuition can have
progress by having such restriction.
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